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Abstract
Schmukler  and Serven investigate the patterns  and  derived from interbank rates, particularly during times  of
determinants of the currency risk premium in two  crisis.  The large magnitude  of these cross-market
currency boards-Argentina  and Hong Kong.  Despite  differences  can be the consequence  of unexploited
the presumed rigidity of currency boards,  currency  arbitrage  opportunities,  market segmentation,  or other
premium  is almost always positive  and at times very  risks embedded in typical measures of currency  risk. The
large. Its term structure is usually upward sloping, but  premium and its term structure depend on domestic and
flattens out or even becomes inverted at times  of  global  factors related to devaluation  expectations and
turbulence.  Currency premia differ across  markets. The  risk perceptions.
forward  discount typically exceeds the currency premium
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Interest rate differentials,  the spread between local  interest rates and international
interest rates,  are  a key variable  for emerging  countries.  Spreads  are usually positive  for
these  countries,  which  implies  that  they  face  a  higher  cost  of capital  than  developed
economies.  Interest rate  differentials  vary substantially over time and increase  in periods
of local  and foreign  financial  turmoil,  and this  has lead  to "sudden stops"  of economic
activity in emerging  economies.'  Lower spreads typically  translate into  lower borrowing
costs, for both the public and private sector, and higher growth. For that reason, the ways
to  achieve  a reduction  in  interest  rate  differentials  have  been recently  at  the  center  of
academic  debate and have been a major concern for policy makers
Conceptually,  the  total  differential  between  interest  rates  on domestic  currency-
loans  issued by local  borrowers  and  those on  foreign-currency  loans  issued  by foreign
borrowers  reflects  both  country  and  currency  premia.  The  former  refers  to  the  gap
between  the borrowing  costs of domestic  and  foreign borrowers  in a common  currency.
The latter,  on which this paper  focuses, refers to the  gap between the domestic-currency
and foreign-currency  interest rates faced by a given borrower;  it is often called "currency
risk premium" and, less precisely but more popularly, currency risk.
Of the two components  of interest rate differentials,  the country risk premium has
been  intensively  studied,  perhaps  due  to  the  availability  of daily  cross-country  data.
Indexes of yield spreads on emerging market bonds (EMBIs)  are compiled by JP Morgan.
Data on primary issues also exist.  The literature has studied  the behavior of yield spreads
See Calvo (1998).including their time pattern,  determinants,  and cross-country  comovement.2 Some papers
also study the country risk premium in relation to the currency premium.3
The  other  component  of interest  rate  differentials,  the  currency  premium,  has
received  less  direct empirical  attention  in the  context of emerging  economies.  Still,  the
currency premium  is relevant to several strands of the literature  - like those on exchange
rate determination,  uncovered  interest parity,  and  real  interest  parity.  The present study
relates directly to at least four different strands of the  international finance  literature:  the
debate  on the choice of exchange  rate regime,  the assessment of economic  perfornance
under currency boards, the term structure of currency premia,  and covered interest parity.
First, the debate  on the choice of exchange rate regime pays particular attention to
the currency  premium.  Participants  in this debate,  which intensified  during the currency
crises of the 1  990s, have claimed that countries should opt for either hard pegs or floating
regimes.  Proponents  of hard pegs argue  that,  other things  equal,  the adoption  of a rigid
parity  - such  as  a  currency  board  - should  reduce  the  currency  premium,  even
eliminating  it  entirely if the  peg  is  viewed  as  irrevocable.  In  this  view,  hard pegs  are
thought to be credible and transparent, and this yields financial stability and low inflation.
As a consequence,  hard pegs would reduce the level of domestic  interest  rates.4 Credible
hard pegs  would  also reduce  the probability  of currency  attacks  and  contagion  effects.
2 See, for example,  Edwards (1984),  Edwards (1986), Favero,  Giavazzi,  and Spaventa (1997), Eichengreen
and Mody  (1998), Kamin and von Kleist (1999),  Mauro,  Sussman, and Yafeh (2000),  Kaminsky  and
Schmukler (2001), Merrick (2001), and Rigobon (2001).
3 See Domowitz,  Glen, and Madhavan  (1998),  Sturzenegger and Powell (2000), Didier and Garcia  (2001),
and Druck, Moron, and Stein (2001).
4 Note,  however,  that even if the currency premium  declines  the country  premium  could rise if adopting  a
rigid peg is perceived  to weaken  the country's  solvency.  In such  case, the  net effect  on the  level  of
borrowing  cots would be ambiguous.
2But as Edwards (2000)  suggests,  the currency premium can still be  significantly positive
even in hard pegs, if they are not fully credible.
Second, the debate on exchange  rate regimes has generated  a related literature on
economic  performance  under currency  boards. Ghosh,  Gulde,  and Wolf (1998)  find that
currency  boards  are  associated  with  better  inflation  performance  and  higher  output
growth.  Kwan  and  Lui  (1996)  argue  that  currency  boards  tend  to  slow  down  output
growth but reduce inflation.  They also claim that currency boards might result in higher
output volatility  than  flexible  regimes.  Rivera  Batiz  and  Sy (2000)  argue  that currency
boards  yield  more  credibility  and  better  economic  performance  than  simple  pegs.
Hausmann  (2001)  discusses  the conditions  that might  help  alleviate  potential  problems
due  to  the rigidity  of currency  boards.  Calomiris  and  Powell  (2001)  describe  how  the
Argentine  currency board helped in the development of the financial system.
The third strand  of the literature  relevant  to this paper  is the one that  studies the
term  structure  of currency  premia.  The  term  structure  reflects  markets'  perception  of
depreciation  and exchange  risk  at different  horizons,  and has been  studied mostly in the
literature  on target zones.  For example, Svenson (1991) shows that under a credible target
zone  the  absolute  value  of the  interest  rate  differential  is  decreasing  in  the  time  to
maturity,  since  the expected depreciation  until maturity  is bounded  by the exchange  rate
band.  Bartolini  and Bodnar  (1992)  study the term structure  of forward premia  to assess
the implied  credibility of the  French/German  target zone  under the European Monetary
System.  Weak  currencies  are  found  to  be  associated  with  upward-sloping  forward
premia,  as investors forecast  a further depreciation of the currency over the next periods.
Their results also  show that  the short-term  premium fluctuates  more than the long-term
3premium.  Domowitz,  Glen,  and  Madhavan  (1998)  examine  the  term  structure  of the
currency premium in the case of Mexico up to the Tequila crisis. They show that the term
premium turned negative before and during the crisis.
The  fourth  strand  of the  literature  directly relevant  to this paper  is  the  one that
studies  covered  interest  parity.  This  literature  shows  that,  in the  absence  of  country
barriers  or other risks,  interest rate  differentials  are equal to the forward discount implied
by the future  and spot exchange rates. This fact is generally  supported by the literature on
industrial  economies.  The  evidence  for  emerging  markets  is  much  more  limited  and
concentrated on few countries.5
The present  paper  sheds  new light on these  strands  of the  international  finance
literature by providing  a comprehensive  characterization  of the currency premium  in two
currency boards,  Argentina and  Hong Kong.  Focusing on these two economies  has two
major advantages.  First,  these  two  currency  boards  have  a rich  history,  which  pernits
analyzing  how  domestic  and  international  events  impact  on  the  currency  premium.
Second, these two cases offer a wide range of data not available for other economies.
This  paper  explores  five  major  dimensions  of the  currency  premium.  First,  we
provide  an  analytical  characterization  of the  various  components  of the  total  interest
differential  and,  in  particular,  of the  currency  premium.  We  also  draw  a  distinction
between "strict"  and "broad" versions of covered interest parity, that has been overlooked
in much of the empirical literature.  Second, we assess the extent to which hard pegs have
in  fact resulted  in low  and/or stable  currency  premia,  an aspect of currency  boards  that
5 See,  for  example,  Branson  (1969),  Frenkel  and  Levich  (1977),  Deardorff (1973),  Dooley  and  Isaard
(1980),  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  (1985),  Artis  and  Taylor (1990),  Frankel  (1992),  Chinn  and  Frankel
(1994), Obstfeld (1995), and Kumhof (2000).
4has so  far received little attention  in the  debate on exchange  rate regimes.  We document
the time pattern of the currency premium and its response  to major domestic  and foreign
events. Third, we study the term structure of the currency premium  in different markets -
the money market and the foreign exchange market.  We characterize  its behavior  during
tranquil  and  turbulent times  to  gauge  investors'  expectations  about  the  future  of rigid
currency pegs. This is possible  because  in these economies  the most important financial
contracts  are denominated  in both local  currency  and U.S.  dollars.  Fourth, we show how
different  financial  instruments  embody  diverging  assessments  of the  currency  premium,
particularly  at times  of financial  stress.  These  cross-market  discrepancies  pose  a puzzle
that  might  reflect  market  segmentation,  unexploited  arbitrage  opportunities,  or  the
presence of other risks embedded in the commonly used measures of currency  risk. Fifth,
we study the determinants  of the currency premium and its term structure,  using detailed
daily domestic and international financial data as well as political and economic  events.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  provides  a  simple
analytical  framework  for  the paper.  Section  III documents  the  empirical  regularities  of
the currency premium  and its term structure  in Argentina  and Hong Kong over time  and
across  instruments  and  maturities.  The  section  also  presents  information  on  the
institutional  features of forward markets.  Section IV empirically studies  the determinants
of the  premium  and  its term  structure.  Section  V  concludes.  The  appendix  assesses  the
extent of cross-market differences in currency premia.
51I.  A simple  analytical framework
Consider the interest differential between assets that may differ in terms of issuer,
currency of denomination,  and jurisdiction  of issue - but are  identical in other respects.
Formally,  let  R,,k  denote the  annualized  gross  yield  (i.e.,  one  plus  the  interest  rate)  at
time t on local-currency debt issued in the home country with k-period  maturity;  let  R;k
denote  the gross  yield on foreign-currency  debt  of the same  maturity issued at home by
the same  debtor (or,  more  precisely,  posing identical  default risk  as  the local-currency
debt);  and let  R,f denote  the gross  yield paid  abroad  on foreign-currency  debt  with the
same  maturity,  issued by some  benchmark  foreign  debtor (in the  context  of sovereign
debt,  typically  taken  to  be  the  U.S.  government).  To  break  down  the  total  yield
differential  into its two components we start from the identity
R,k  R,k  R,w'  (
Rk  Rk  R(,k
Taking logs, letting i,.k  In (Rlk), and similarly with the other yields, we can write
(il'k  i4,k)  (t-  itk)  +  (i,*,  - i,*f )(2)
currency premium1,k  country premium,k
II.a The currency premium
Let's  ignore  for  the  moment  the  country  premium  and  focus  on  the  currency
premium.  The  latter  refers  to  the  difference  between  the  returns  on  two  securities
identical in  all  respects  except for their currency  denomination  - i.e.,  they are  issued in
the same jurisdiction and involve identical (or are free from) default risk.
Speculation  across  these  two assets  by risk-neutral  investors  would  result in the
well-known uncovered interest parity condition:
6RIk  R  R  E  IS,k  (3)
where  E,S,,k  is  the  expectation  at  time  t of the  exchange  rate  at  time  t+k,  and  the
exchange  rate  is  defined  as  local  currency  per  unit  of  foreign  currency.  Letting
As'  denote  the  (per  period)  anticipated  percentage  change  in  the  spot  exchange  rate
r,k
kIn  '  S+k  ,  we can rewrite (3) as
(i,k  -it,k )i  AS,k  (
so that the  currency premium equals the  anticipated  rate  of change of the exchange  rate.
A considerable empirical  literature has investigated the consistency of the data with (3) or
its equivalent  (4). The frequent failure of uncovered  interest parity to hold in practice has
been  traced  to  two  main  sources  (Lewis  1995):  persistent  expectation  errors  - due  to
irrationality,  agent  heterogeneity,  or peso problems  - and  risk  aversion,  what  is  more
important for our purposes.
Under risk  aversion,  investors  demand  a compensation  for the risk of exchange
rate  changes,  and in such case  the  interest  differential  (4) has to be expanded to include
also  an  exchange  rate  risk  premium.  Thus,  in the  general  case  the  currency  premium
consists of two components:
(itk -itk)  =  N5 e  +  errp, k  (5)
currency premium,,k  anticipated  devaluation,k  exchange risk premium/k
where  errp denotes  the  exchange  risk  premium.  There  is  a  literature  that  attempts  to
break down  empirically the currency  premium  into these two components,  using survey
7data on exchange  rate forecasts  (Frankel  1991)  or Kalman  filter techniques (Wolf 1987,
Cheung  1993).
II.b The country premium
The  country premium  can also be broken  down into  two terms:  the pure default
premium  and  what  we  shall  label  the  "onshore  premium."  These  two  premia  are
associated  with  default  and  transaction  risks  related  to cross-country  transactions.  The
pure  default premium  refers  to the  return  differential  between  identical  assets  issued in
the same jurisdiction by two different  borrowers  posing  different  default  risk.  Hence  it
reflects  the possibility  that borrowers  may  not honor their  debts.  In  turn,  the onshore
premium  refers  to  the  return  differential  between  assets  issued  in  two  different
jurisdictions  (onshore  and offshore)  by the  same borrower,  and reflects  the cost and risk
derived  from  shifting  assets  across  jurisdictions  (Aliber  1973).  Hence,  it  relates  to
ingredients  such as  capital controls,  differential taxation,  commissions,  and fees,  as well
as the risk of changes in regulations  (e.g.,  changes  in the status of capital  controls)  or in
the  market  conditions  that  affect  the  transaction  cost.  Further,  it may  also  reflect  the
differential  legal treatment of default  in the home and  foreign jurisdictions - which can
make a given borrower  more likely to default in one jurisdiction  (typically onshore) than
in the other (offshore).6 Formally:
R,  Rk  offshoreR*  (
offshore  R*f  (6)
R,*,fk  R~t*,k  Rz,k
6 Default  regulations  in  major  financial  centers  such as New  York and London  are stricter  than  those in
many emerging  markets,  making the costs of default on  offshore  instruments much larger than  those
on onshore  instruments.  This issue has recently become prominent  in the context of external payments
difficulties,  such as the Ecuador default and Argentina's  "debt swap."
8where  ffshreR*t,,k  denotes  the  gross  yield  on foreign-currency  instruments  issued  abroad
by domestic debtors  with the same  characteristics  as those  issued  at home  (which  yield
R*t,k).  Taking logs and using the same notation as before, we have
(itk  k-  i,k)  =  (it  -ogshoreit)  +  (offshore i  i  )  (7)
country premium,k  onshore premiuMr,k  pure default premium,k
II.c Strict and broad covered interest parity
If a  forward  exchange  market  exists,  then  risk-free  arbitrage  between  domestic
and  foreign-currency  securities  yields  what  we  shall  label  the  "broad"  version  of the
covered interest parity condition:
R,#k  =R  f  t+k  (8)
where  F., is  the  k-period  forward  exchange  rate  at  time  t. This is  a broad  version  of
covered  interest  parity  because  the  assets  involved  may  differ  in  currency  of
denomination,  issuer (domestic  versus  foreign)  and jurisdiction  of issue  (onshore versus
offshore).  As  before,  equation  (8)  can  be  rewritten  to  show  that  the  interest  rate
differential equals the forward discount:
(itk  -'I,k)  fd,k,  (9)
where  fd, k = I ln[  h{k  1. Thus, under broad covered interest parity there  are in principle
two identical measures of the currency premium,  (it,k-i,k ) and  fj' ,k
A  considerable  empirical  literature  tests  the  broad  version  of covered  interest
parity,  comparing  (i,k - i{*)  with the forward  discount.  It is  clear  from (7)  that nonzero
9onshore  premia (due for example  to existing  or anticipated  capital  controls)  and/or pure
default premia  (due  to the  differential  default risk  of local  and  Ibrcign borrowers)  will
lead to the  failure  of broad  covered  interest  parity,  a result  comnonly  fourLd  in studies
using emerging market data.
In contrast, the "strict" version of the covered interest parity condition states that
(i,#  i,t  =fd,,k . (10)
In this version,  the assets involved differ only in their currency  of denomination  but not
in their issuer.
Although empirical  tests of the "strict" version of covered  interest parity  are hard
to find in the literature,  in principle one  would expect it to hold up  more generally  than
the broad version.  But in practice  several factors  can cause even the strict parity condition
to fail.  First,  default risk may  differ across  instruments  issued in alternative  currencies,
even when  issued by the  same borrower  in the  same jurisdiction.  This might reflect, for
example,  a  threat  of  mandatory  re-denomination  of foreign-currency  assets  into  local
currency assets (akin to partial confiscation in the case of a devaluation),  or also the fact
that the government  can print only local currency, so that it can redeem its local-currency
obligations  more easily than its foreign currency  ones (or those of any debtor in need of
bailout).  In these circumstances,  observed  asset yields  do not equal  anticipated ones,  and
strict covered interest parity can fail to hold.
A  second  factor  that can potentially  affect  the  strict version  of covered  interest
parity is  transaction costs.  Aside from  default risk,  arbitrage  across  onshore instruments
in different currencies might involve potentially large costs resulting from various market
imperfections  - such  as the  impossibility  of shorting  certain  assets,  or the  presence  of
10large bid-ask  spreads  reflecting  market illiquidity.  This can  also lead  to a failure of the
strict  version  of covered  interest  parity.7 In  such  case,  deviations  f.rom  strict  covered
interest parity would be bounded by the magnitude of transaction  costs.  In the appendix
we provide a more detailed analytical  and empirical discussion of these issues.
We  conclude  this  section with a  final point  on the  exchange  rate risk premium.
Ignoring  for the moment  default risk and  transaction  costs - so that strict covered parity
holds -- equations  (7) and (10) together  imply that the exchange risk premium equals the
difference between the forward premium and anticipated depreciation:
errpt  k  = (Jdt,  k  k)  (  1)
The patterns  and determinants  of the  exchange risk premium  have received  considerable
attention  in  the  literature  (e.g.,  Engel  1992,  1996;  Lewis  1995).  In  a  context  of
intertemporally-optimizing  investors,  it can  be shown that the risk premium  arises from
the  covariance  between  exchange  rates  and  real  consumption  when  investors  are  risk
averse.8 The premium can be positive or negative,  which roughly speaking can be viewed
as  reflecting  whether  the domestic  currency  is perceived  as more  or less risky than  the
foreign  currency,  respectively.  Several papers  have  explored  how the magnitude  of the
risk premium  is  affected  by  investors'  preferences  towards  risk.  On  analytical  grounds
the result  is ambiguoi  s, and depends  on  the  specifics  of the  model at  hand (see  Engel
7  A  considerable  literature  has  explored  how  various  forms  of transaction  costs  may  lead  to  market
segmentation  and impact on covered  interest arbitrage;  see for example Blenman (1991).
8 See  for  example  Obsfeld  and  Rogoff  (1998)  and  Engel  (1999).  More  precisely,  the  exchange  risk
premium, typically measured as E,[S,+1 - F,+,]l  S, (the "nominal premium") or as E4[(S,.,  - F,+,)IP,+,] /
S,  (the  "real premium",  see  e.g.,  Hakkio  and Siebert  1995)  generally  involves  two  terms:  one  that
depends on the degree  of investors'  risk aversion and the covariance  mentioned  in the text (which can
be interpreted  as the risk premium proper), plus another term reflecting  nonlinearity of the premium in
its defining variables.  The latter term  is independent  of risk preferences  and is generally  presumed to
be small in magnitude.
111999).  Numerical  simulations  find  more  often  than  not  that  higher  degrees  of  risk
aversion lead to larger (in absolute terms) risk premia.9
IId The term structure of currency premia
Finally,  we  consider  briefly the  term  structure  of currency  premia (obviously,
similar  considerations  can  be  made  for  country  premia,  but  we  will  not pursue  them
here). For two different maturities  k and k' we can write from (10) and (11)  above
(itk  l-k)  (i ,k  i,,k  )=  fdk)  fd1,k'  =: s/k -A  k' )+ (errp,,k -errp,k,)  (12)
This equation characterizes  the term structure of currency premia. It reflects both
the  time  path  of  anticipated  depreciation  and  the  term  structure  of the  exchange  risk
premia.  The  literature  has focused  mostly on the former.  Expected  depreciation  can be
further decomposed  into  the perceived  probability of devaluation  and the magnitude  of
the  devaluation,  conditional  on  devaluation  taking  place.  The  time  paths  of these  two
factors shape the term structure of anticipated  depreciation  and thereby the term structure
of currency premia.
Alternative  trajectories  of  the  subjective  probability  and  the  conditional
magnitude  of devaluation  can  result  in very different  term structures.  In particular,  the
term structure can become inverted if the bulk of anticipated  depreciation  is concentrated
in the near rather than the distant future.'° This may happen,  for example,  when there is a
9See  for  example  Hakkio  and  Siebert  (1995),  Siebert  (1996),  and  Evans  and  Kenc  (2001).  The  latter
authors  also  find  that  the  risk  premium  is  relatively  insensitive  to  changes  in  the  pattern  of
correlations among the forcing variables  in their model.
0 As an example,  consider  a fixed exchange  rate regime  where at time t the (log) exchange  rate is so, and
devaluation can happen  at some uncertain  future time  r. Let s,+,k>so denote the exchange  rate holding
at time t+k if devaluation has already  happened (otherwise  the exchange rate  stays unchanged  at so).
12perceived probability of collapse  of a fixed exchange  rate regime,  and the exchange rate
after  the  collapse  is  expected  to  overshoot  - so  that  the magnitude  of the  conditional
depreciation  is larger in the short than in the long run.  Overshooting  aside, term structure
inversion  is  also more  likely if agents  expect devaluation  to take place  in the near rather
than the  long term - e.g., they expect  either an immediate devaluation  or no devaluation
at all.
Along these lines,  there is  some literature  that attempts  to identify the likely term
structure  of  expected  depreciation  under  alternative  currency  regimes.  For  example,
Favero,  Giavazzi,  and Spaventa (1997)  argue that under floating  exchange rates the term
structure  of anticipated depreciation tends to be flatter (even  inverted)  than under pegged
rates,  as  in the former  regime the bulk of depreciation  may be projected to occur in the
near  future, while  in the latter  a plausible  scenario may  be  an eventual  abandonment  of
the peg, along with a cumulative  devaluation.
Let P[T >u]  denote  the  subjective  probability  that  devaluation  will  not  happen prior  to time u. The
term structure of anticipated depreciation between t+k and t+k+j is:
1j E  [St+k+j -So] -IEt[s,+k  -so] =  I  Plir<t+k+j][s, 4 k+J- -s]-  -r  < t +k]  [Stk -sO].
k+j  .k  k+j  k
After some manipulation,  this can be rewritten as:
kI  J  (t  k  jo  Prrtkk  j 'StkSt±k  -SO] k +j Pt+k<  < t + k + j](s,+k+j  o  k Jj  P['r  < t + k]  J  kkj  tk_st*s 
The  first part of this  expression  reflects  the  possibility of devaluation  happening  between  t and t+k - i.e.,
beyond  the  short  run.  It  is  non-negative  and  contributes  to  an  upward-sloping  term  structure.  The
second part of the  expression reflects  the  possibility of devaluation  happening  in the  short  termn  -i.e,
prior to  t+k. It is  proportional  to  the  difference  in the  rates of depreciation  between  t  and t+k and
between  t+k and t+k+j. Its  sign  is ambiguous  and  depends  on the  anticipated path  of the  exchange
rate  when  devaluation  has  happened.  If the  path  involves  a  constant  rate  of depreciation,  then  the
expression  equals  zero  (the  same  happens  if no  devaluation  can  occur  prior  to  t+k).  If a  step
devaluation  is anticipated (i.e.,  S,+k = S,+k+, ) or, more  generally, if a decelerating  rate of depreciation is
expected (such as in the case of exchange rate overshooting),  the expression is negative.
1  3III. Institutional features and empirical regularities
We next document the  empirical regularities  of the currency premium under two
currency  boards,  Argentina  and  Hong  Kong.  We  use  daily  data  obtained  from
Bloomberg,  the  Central  Bank  of  Argentina,  Deutsche  Bank,  and  the  Hong  Kong
Monetary  Authority.  The  data set contains rates  from different markets  and instruments
(money market rates,  interbank rates, and non-deliverable  forwards),  different  currencies
(Argentine  pesos,  Hong  Kong  dollars,  and  U.S.  dollars),  and  different  maturities
(typically  1-,  3-,  6-,  and  12-month).  See Appendix Table  3 for a thorough  description.
This data set allows us to construct different measures of the premium for each of the two
currency boards.
Since we will be working with premia  embedded in forward  contracts,  we begin
by describing  the  institutional  characteristics  of forward markets,  which  are  not widely
known.  Next,  we  present  an overview  of the  evolution  of the  currency  risk premium
under the two currency boards, going as far into the past as the data permit, and relating
the  observed  developments  in the premium  with major local  and  global  events.  To do
this, for each of the two countries  we use the measure  of the currency premium offering
the  longest  time  coverage.  We  then  discuss  the  different  measures  of  the  currency
premium available  from the data and compare their behavior. Finally, we characterize  the
term structure of the currency premium.
14III.a The forward exchange  market 11
There are  different  instruments  traded in the  foreign exchange  market.  The main
ones are spot exchange contracts,  forward contracts,  and foreign exchange  swaps.  Related
instruments  like  cross-currency  interest  rate  swaps  and  foreign  exchange  options  are
traded in the interest rate derivatives markets.
Forward  contracts  are  derivatives  designed  to  hedge  foreign  currency  exposure.
There  are two types of forward contracts.  Foreign  exchange forwards  (outright forwards)
are  currency trades  to be  settled at an  agreed time in  the future.  These contracts  are also
called  deliverable  forwards.  Non-deliverable  forwards  (NDFs)  are  forward  transactions
whose settlement is made  by a cash payment  in U.S.  dollars reflecting the market value
of the contract,  so that no local currency changes  hands. Similar contracts used for major
currencies  are  the  so-called  "foreign  exchange  transactions  that  settle  in  difference"
(FXDS).  NDF  contract  are  mostly  used  for  emerging  market  currencies;  they  involve
smaller volume trades and longer dated maturities.
NDFs  are  used  as  a means  to  scale  back  foreign  exchange  settlement  risk.  This
risk arises because in foreign exchange transactions currency may need to be paid out by
one party before  the other currency  is received,  making the first party  vulnerable  to the
risk  that  the  second  party  does  not  fulfill  its  obligation.  Other  advantages  of these
contracts  over deliverable  contracts  include  lower transactions  costs,  a reduced  role  for
credit limits, and greater liquidity.  With no principal  to exchange and no principal  at risk,
credit limits are less important and liquidity is enhanced.
For more information  on  these  markets,  see  Federal Reserve  Bank of New  York (2001)  and the Trade
Association  for Emerging  Markets  at  www.emta.pog.  We  especially thank Starla  Cohen from  EMTA
for sharing data with us.
15Even  though  NDFs  present  fewer  risks  than  deliverable  forwards,  they do  still
pose some risk. The primarily concern  is "fixing risk," namely whether it will be possible
to  calculate  the  exchange  rate  in order  to  value  the  contract  and  determine  the  dollar
settlement amount.  For certain currencies,  this risk is  considered more manageable  than
the risks associated with deliverable  contracts,  since the currency at issue might become
subject to restrictions, making it impossible to transfer the currency to the counterparty.'2
(A previous  problem  was  related to  the  documentation  of these  trades,  causing  many
transactions not to be properly confirmed.  This problem has now been addressed.)
NDFs  are  traded  mostly  in New  York  for Latin  American  currencies.  Russian,
Central  and  Eastern  European  currencies  trade  out  of London.  The  market  for  Asian
currencies  trades  out  of Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  and  Tokyo,  with  Singapore  being the
most significant market.  The banks that participate  in this market  are large  international
banks.  They include ABN AMRO,  AIG,  Bank of America,  Deutsche  Bank,  Fleet Bank,
Goldman Sachs,  HSBC, ING-Barings, JP Morgan Chase, Merril Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
Standard  Chartered,  and UBS.  There  are  approximately 40 institutions  in the Emerging
Markets Traders Association (EMTA) NDF working group; approximately 20 institutions
participate  regularly  in the  working  group  meetings.  Most  trades  are  believed  to  take
place  between  dealers  offshore.  Most  of the  inter-dealer  activity,  however,  involves
hedging underlying contracts  with clients.
The most important NDF currencies  are the Argentinean  peso, the Brazilian  real,
the five  major  currencies  in Asia  (the  Chinese  renminbi,  the  Indian rupee,  the  Korean
won,  the  Philippine  peso,  the  Taiwan  dollar),  and  the  Hungarian  forint.  Activity  in
12 Another problem - now settled - with NDF contracts related to the incomplete documentation of the
trades,  which caused many transactions not to be properly  confirmed.
16Russian  ruble  is very slight at present.  There  is also some trading activity in the Chilean
peso and the Peruvian sol. Possibly developing  into NDF markets are also the Indonesian
rupiah and the Thai baht.
Volume  information  on NDF transactions  is  limited,  because  the corresponding
data  is  not publicly  available  and because  market  participants  do  not necessarily  mark
their deliverable  and NDF transactions  separately.  As  part of the triennial  central  bank
survey  of foreign  exchange  and  derivatives  market  activity  prepared  by the  Bank  for
International  Settlements,  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New  York  (2001)  recently
collected  some  statistics on the  turnover of forward  contracts  (including  deliverable  and
non-deliverable  forwards)  in  the  U.S.  during  April  2001.  From  this  survey,  one  can
conclude that forward markets  are large when compared  with spot markets.  In the overall
U.S.  market,  forward  contracts  represent  about  one  third  of the  spot  foreign  exchange
market.  Turnover  in  the U.S.  spot market  was  $1.8  trillion  while  that of the  forward
market  was  $640  billion  during  April  2001.  But  when  looking  beyond  the  major  six
currencies  (euro,  Japanese  yen,  British  pound,  Swiss  franc,  Canadian  dollar,  and
Australian dollar) against the U.S. dollar,  forward markets become even more important.
They are  almost as large  as spot markets.  Turnover in the spot market was around  $129
billion,  compared  with  $114  billion  in  the  forward  markets  during  the  month  of the
survey.  When  looking  at individual  currencies,  including  a number  of emerging  market
currencies,  a similar relation holds. For example,  in the case of Hong Kong, turnover was
$10.8 billion in the spot market  and $8 billion  in the forward market.  Although  the NDF
market  for the  Argentine  peso is one  of the  largest,  the report does  not provide  specific
data.
17'III.b The currency premium: evolution  over time
The case ofAr-aentina1 3
On  April  1,  1990,  the  Convertibility  Law  established  the  unrestricted
convertibility of the peso  into U.S.  dollars at a fixed rate of 1 to  1 for both current  and
capital  account transactions.  The convertibility  of the peso  and its parity  are defined  by
law;  any modifications must be approved  by Congress.  The law requires the central bank
to hold an amount  of dollars  equal to the entire  monetary  base  at all times,  although  a
limited proportion  of this backing  can be held  in domestic  government  bonds.  For this
reason, some argue that the Argentine  scheme is not a currency board in a strict sense.
The  currency board in Argentina offers  a fruitful ground to study the behavior of
the  currency  premium.  Figure  1 and  Table  1 display  the time  pattern  of the  currency
premium, measured  by the difference  between the  1-month peso and dollar local deposit
rates  (in  annual  terms),  and  its  summary  statistics.  We  use  deposit rates,  which  are
generally less sensitive than other rates to the different political and economic events.
Table  1 shows  that  in  Argentina  the  currency  premium  remained  positive
throughout  the period for which data  is available,  although in general  its magnitude was
modest  - the  sample  mean  equals  189  basis  points.  However,  the  premium  varied
significantly  over time, reflecting major domestic  and international  events  that impacted
on actual  and  anticipated  monetary  and  financial  conditions  in Argentina.  During these
"crisis"  episodes  the average  currency premium  was  382  basis points, while  during the
13 We collected  the events  in Argentina  from  Ganapolsky  and Schmukler  (2001),  who provide  a detailed
description  of the  1995  crisis  management  in  Argentina.  We  also  collected  news  from  two  local
newspapers, Clarin and La Nacion, available online at www.clarin.com  and www.lanacion.com.
18"tranquil"  periods after  the Mexican  crisis the  average  currency premium  was  124.  We
next review briefly the main discrete events affecting the Argentine currency premium.
The Mexican crisis  that started  in December  1994 had strong spillover effects on
Argentina.  The Argentine  peso  came under  attack and there was a nrm on bank deposits.
A number of measures  were taken to avert the collapse of the currency board, but markets
recovered  only after  Mexico  and Argentina  signed an agreement  with  the International
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  in March  1995.  During  the  Mexican  crisis  period  the  average
currency  premium  was  578  basis  points,  well  above  the  average  242  basis  points
registered in October  1994 and the  163  in August 1995.
On May  15,  1995,  former president  Menem was  reelected.  His relation with  the
then economy minister Cavallo (the architect  of the  Convertibility Law)  deteriorated  and
on July 26,  1996 Cavallo was replaced by central bank president Roque Fernandez.  This
triggered  an  increase  of the  currency  prenmium  to  158  basis  points,  from  85  in  the
previous  month.  In October  1997, Argentina  was hit by the Asian crisis,  in particular by
the attack on the Hong Kong currency board. The currency premium hit 393 basis  points
on  November  6.  Then  the  Russian  devaluation  and  default  on  August  18,  1998  also
impacted  Argentina,  as well  as other markets  around the  world.  The  currency  premium
jumped to 405 basis points on September  15. Argentina was also hit by the devaluation of
the Brazilian real on January  13,  1999,  with the currency premium rising to an average  of
210 basis points in the aftermath of this event. The then former minister Cavallo  declared
to the Financial Times newspaper on May  17,  1999 that Argentina could eventually  float
its currency  while maintaining  the  convertibility  program.  The  markets  reacted  with  an
increase  in the  currency premium  to  185 basis  points on June  1. The  currency premium
19continued climbing due to the political uncertainty surrounding the upcoming presidential
election.
On October  23,  1999, De  la Rua  was elected  as the new president of Argentina.
The currency premium continued  increasing but declined  significantly  in January  2001.
Almost one year after taking his post, vice president  Carlos Alvarez resigned on October
6,  2000, due to disagreements  with the president upon how to resolve  an existing bribery
scandal in the Senate.  This generated  a political  crisis in the government  alliance, and the
currency  premium  rose  to  an  average  of  216  basis  points  in  the  aftermath  of the
resignation.  The  political  and  economic  situation  stabilized  until  economy  minister
Machinea  resigned  on March  2,  2001,  after  agreeing  to  a 40 billion  package  with  the
international community on December 2000.
On March  19, two weeks after the resignation of economy minister Machinea,  the
newly  appointed  economy  minister  Lopez  Murphy  resigned  as  well,  upon  strong
opposition  to  the  new  package  he  had  sent  to  Congress  on  March  16.  The  currency
premium rose  sharply on March  16  to 387  basis  points.  Cavallo  assumed  once more  as
economy  minister  and,  on April  16,  he sent to Congress  a proposed amendment  to the
Convertibility  Law, according  to which the peso would be pegged to a basket consisting
of U.S. dollars  and euros  with equal weights.'4 On April 20,  after  a week in which the
government  had actively promoted  the newly proposed  currency board,  former president
Menem advised citizens to convert their pesos into U.S. dollars, arguing that the proposed
law entailed  a devaluation of the peso. The currency premium peaked again, hitting  1,100
basis points.  On the whole, over the two-month period following the change in economy
I  Congress approved the law in mid June.
20ministers  the currency premium  averaged  548 basis points.  The last crisis in the sample
starts on July  10, 2001,  when the government was  forced to pay an interest rate of 1,410
basis  points  at  the  time  it  issued  a short-term  bond.  Both market  participants  and  the
government considered  at that time that it was not longer possible to continue  accessing
capital  markets  at  sustainable  rates.  The  government  decided  to  stop  tapping  capital
markets  and  to  reduce  expenditures  to  eliminate  the  financing  gap.  When  this  cut  of
international  credit became  obvious, the currency premium rose  to  1,986  basis points on
July 13 and remained high thereafter at an average over 1,000 basis points.
To  give  a rough  idea of the economic  dimension  of these premia,  assume  for  a
moment  that  uncovered  interest  parity  holds  (as  in  equation  (4)  above).  The  observed
interest differential  then provides  a direct  measure  of devaluation  expectations,  and we
can  compute  the magnitude  of the  anticipated  depreciation  consistent  with the data  for
various  subjective  probabilities  of devaluation.  Specifically,  we  consider  10,  25,  50, 75,
and 90  percent probability of devaluation  over the coming  month.  Table  2  displays  the
implied devaluation  magnitudes,  distinguishing  between  tranquil  and crisis  periods.  We
use the maximum  value reached  by the currency  premium during  each period to obtain
the  maximum  expected  devaluation.  The  table  shows  that  during  tranquil  periods  a
premium  of 812  basis  points  on  a  1-month  deposit  annualized rate  corresponds  to  an
expected  devaluation  of 8,122  (902)  basis  points  for  a  10  (90)  percent  probability  of
devaluation.  At the other extreme,  when Argentina suffered the cut of international credit,
the  expected  devaluation  jumped  to  19,861  (2,207)  basis  points  under  an  expected
probability of devaluation  of 10 (90) percent. Though these magnitudes  are already large,
21from the discussion below it will become apparent that similar calculations  applied to the
NDF currency premium would yield a much larger anticipated devaluation.
The case of  Hong KonZj5
The  currency  board  in  Hong  Kong  also  offers  an  interesting  case  study  of the
currency premium.  In this  case,  we use  the currency premium  implied from deliverable
forwards.  The  premium  and  the  corresponding  summary  statistics  for  the  1-month
maturity (in annual terms) are also reported in Figure  1 and Table 1.
The  Hong  Kong  currency  board  was  established  in  October  1983.  The  Hong
Kong  dollar  is  pegged  to  the  U.S.  dollar  7.80  to  1, but in  September  1998  the  rate
changed  to 7.75  to  1. Between  April  1999  and  August  2000 the  exchange  rate  moved
gradually  from  7.75  back  to  7.80.  Since  1983  the  Hong  Kong  dollar  has  been  freely
convertible. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority is responsible for keeping the peg.
Table  1 shows  that,  unlike  in  Argentina,  the  currency  premium  was  at  times
negative  (although of small magnitude)  in Hong-Kong.  Its sample mean  is close to zero
in tranquil  times,  and  equal to  301  basis points  in turbulent  times.  Another  difference
with Argentina  is that there are fewer identifiable events, and instead there is a prolonged
period of turbulence surrounding the East Asian crisis.
Although  not very  large,  the  Mexican  crisis  had some  spillover  effects  on East
Asia,  where  it  put pressure  on strong  currencies.  On  January  12,  1995,  the  currency
premium  in Hong Kong jumped to  193  basis points  from 63,  and hit 340 on January 23.
is  We collected  the events  in  Hong Kong  from  Bloomberg,  the Financial  Times,  and Nouriel  Roubini's
website,  www.stern.nvu.edu/globalmacro/AsiaChronoloezyl.htmnl,  and  Cheng,  Kwan,  and  Lui
(I 999b).
22But the impact of the East Asia crisis was much stronger.  On January 27,  1997,  after the
collapse  of a  large  South  Korean  chaebol  and  signs  of financial  distress,  Hong  Kong
decided  to  take  part  in  an  International  Monetary  Fund  scheme  to  help  countries
threatened with  financial  or economic crises  and to secure its position  as an  international
financial  center. The following  day, the currency premium jumped from -19 to 375 basis
points.  On  May  14  and  15,  1997,  the  Thai baht was  hit by  a  speculative  attack.  Some
governments  intervened  in the foreign  exchange  markets  and even  introduced  selective
capital controls.  The  Hong Kong currency premium jumped from 83 to 288 basis points
on May  19 and then to 621  on June  15,  as the financial  situation deteriorated  in Thailand.
On  July  2,  1997,  Thailand  was  forced  to  float the  baht,  and  the  crisis  spread  to  other
countries.
During the  East Asian  crisis  the Hong Kong  dollar  suffered  four  major  attacks.
The first attack  started  on August  15.  The  currency premium  increased from  178 to  826
basis points on that day and further to 1,157 basis points on August 18.  The attack on the
Hong  Kong dollar peaked  the week of October  20,  after  the devaluation  of the Taiwan
dollar the previous  week.  The currency premium hit its all-time high of 2,840 basis points
on  October  23.  The  attack  on  the  Hong  Kong  dollar  was  different  from  the  typical
currency  attack  because  speculators  were  shortening  both  stocks  and  the  currency.
Investors borrowed equities in Hong Kong dollars  and held long position on U.S. dollars.
Due  to  the  currency  board  constraints,  the  interest rate  rose  to compensate  the reserve
outflow,  further  depressing  equity  prices.  To  stop  speculation,  the  monetary  authority
intervened in the equity market buying stocks and futures.' 6
16See Chakravorti and Lail (2000)  for an explanation of this simultaneous attack.
23In early  1998, the crisis continued deepening  as several currencies  in the region -
including those of Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  and the Philippines  - reached historic
lows relative to the U.S. dollar.  The currency premium went from 366 to 849 on January
7 and  1,165  on January  12,  when the Hong Kong dollar suffered the second major attack
during  January  12-20.  Markets  throughout  the Pacific  Rim hit another  low on June  10,
with  worries  spreading  to  Japan.  The  third  major  attack  on  the  Hong  Kong  dollar
followed in June  11 -19. The currency premium  increased again that day to 664 from  325,
jumping to  1,119 on June  15.  On August 5, when Chinese officials threatened  to devalue
the  yuan if the yen kept falling,  the Hong Kong currency risk jumped to 664. The fourth
attack  took  place  between  August  26  and  September  2,  with  the  Hong  Kong  dollar
reaching  1,309  on  August  28  after  the  Russian  default.  The  mean  currency  premium
during the  attacks is  much higher than  the one during  tranquil periods,  reaching  values
between  386  and 598  basis  points.  On  September  13,  the chief executive  of the  Hong
Kong Monetary Authority  acknowledged  a possible  change  in the peg from  7.75 to 7.8,
what prompted  an increase  in the currency  premium.  Markets  started  to calm  down on
September  16,  when  the  Hong  Kong  Monetary  Authority  announced  that the  parity
would not change for six months  and that it would then adjust gradually over a period of
500 working days.
Table  2  shows  also  for  the case  of Hong  Kong  the  magnitude  of the  expected
devaluation  implied  by alternative  probabilities  of devaluation.  Again,  these  scenarios
include  a  10,  25,  50,  75,  and 90 percent probability  of devaluation.  Compared  with the
deposit rate estimates from Argentina, the magnitude of the expected devaluation is much
smaller  in  Hong  Kong.  During  tranquil  times,  the  expected  devaluation  ranges  from
243,252  to  361  basis  points  when  considering  a  10  and  90  percent  probability  of
devaluation.  At  the  other  extreme,  during  the  first  attack  on  the  Hong  Kong  dollar
expected  devaluation ranged between  28,398 and 3,155 basis points. This corresponds  to
a currency premium  of 2,840 basis points.
III.c Alternative measures of the currency premium
In  this  section,  we  compare  alternative  measures  of the  currency  premium.  In
Argentina,  interest rates on different types of loans and deposits are quoted both in pesos
and U.S.  dollars. Domestic  and large international  banks participate  in the local financial
market.  The  differentials  between  dollar  and  peso  interest  rates  on  these  instruments
provide measures  of the currency premium  derived from the  money market. In addition,
the forward  discount  implied by NDFs  provides  another measure  of currency  premium.
In  the  case  of  Hong  Kong,  deliverable  forward  contracts  are  also  available.  But  to
construct the currency premium from intebank  rates, we need to use the total interest rate
differential, namely the difference between  the Hong Kong interbank offer rate (HIBOR)
and the London  interbank  offer rate (LIBOR).  This is the same measure  used by Cheng,
Kwan,  and  Lui,  (1999a).  As  noted  in  Section  II,  this  measure  contains  not  only  the
currency premium but also the country premium, which is commonly assumed to be very
small in the case of Hong Kong.
The different measures of the currency premium implied by the various  assets are
displayed  in Figure  2,  while  Table  3 presents  their summary  statistics  for  the  1-month
maturity over the  sample for which  all  measures  are available.  Figure  2  shows  that  the
different  premia  move  generally  together.  For  example,  Table  3  shows  that  the
25correlation  among the  various  Argentine  instruments  ranges between  0.78  and 0.91.  In
the case of Hong Kong, the correlation between the two available rates is 0.94. However,
even though the different measures of currency premia display strong comovement  there
are visible differences  across instruments  and maturities.  Table 3 shows that the currency
premium implied by the forward market tends to be higher than the various measures of
money  market  premia.  In  Argentina,  for  the  whole  sample,  the  (annualized)  average
premium  from  the  NDFs  exceeds  800  basis  points,  while  the  average  premia  derived
from the money market is between 206 and 318 basis points.  This reflects  in part  a few
large  spikes  in  the  forward  discount,  whose  mean  is  considerably  above  the  median.
Among the money market measures, only the currency premium implied by lending rates
shows spikes  of comparable  magnitude.  In the case of Hong Kong,  the average  forward
discount is 58 basis points, while the average difference between local interbank rates and
LIBOR rates is 39, despite the fact that the latter should contain  the country risk premium
in addition to the currency premium.
III.d Term structure of currency risk premia
Comparison of the currency premia at different  maturities can reveal  information
on market perceptions  regarding  the  likelihood,  anticipated  magnitude  and riskiness  of
exchange  rate changes  at different horizons,  as well  as show how  those perceptions  are
affected by domestic and external developments.
We focus on the term premium between  long and short maturities,  defined as the
differential  between the  12-month  and the  1-month currency premia.17 Figure  3 portrays
17 This is  the  same approach used by Domowitz,  Glen, and Madhavan  (1998) to analyze the term structure
of the country and currency  premium in Mexico prior to the Tequila crisis.
26the  term  premium  for  Argentina  and  Hong  Kong,  while  Table  4  presents  the
corresponding  descriptive  statistics.  We  present  two term  premia,  one  derived  from the
forward market,  and another from the interbank market. 1 8
Figure  3  illustrates  how  the  term  premium  reacts  to  relevant  events  to  the
economies.  In the  case of Argentina, the  "yield curve"  of the currency premium appears
to have  become  steeper  after  the  Brazilian  crisis, up  to the  final  portion  of the  sample
corresponding  to the resignation of the economy  ministers, when the yield curve becomes
sharply  inverted.  Thus,  except  for  the  final  part  of  the  sample,  this  suggests  that
devaluation  of the real raised expectations  of eventual, more than immediate, devaluation
of the peso. A similar effect appears to have arisen  from the  1999 Financial Times article
mentioned  above,  in which  Cavallo  first  advanced  the  idea  of modifying  the  currency
board.  Figure  3 shows  that the term  premiurn  increased;  in  fact,  the  1-month  currency
premium  was  flat, while  it rose at  longer maturities.  In other words,  markets  perceived
that no  change  was  likely  in the immediate  future,  but there  was  increased  uncertainty
about  future  changes  after  the  upcoming  presidential  election.  The  term  premium
becomes  negative  at times,  in  particular  during  the  Asian  crisis,  Russia's  default,  and
most notably in the 2001  crisis.
In Hcng Kong, the term premium is close to zero during most of the  sample.  But
the term premium turns slightly negative during the Mexican crisis  and the early  signs of
distress  in  South  Korea.  The  term  turns  sharply  negative  at  the  peak  of the  different
attacks on the Hong Kong dollar. The term premium increased significantly  right after the
first  attack on  the Hong Kong  dollar  and only  converged  to close  to zero  in late  1999.
'As  before,  in the case of Hong Kong the latter measure is based  on the difference  between onshore  Hong
Kong dollar deposit rates and U.S. dollar deposits in the U.S.,  so it may include a country prermium.
27This evidence suggests  that investors revised their expectations  about the sustainability of
the currency board during the crisis, becoming  somewhat pessimistic  about the future of
the peg in the long run after the  Hong Kong dollar was heavily attacked.  In the midst of
the financial stress they were more concerned about the short-tem prospects.
Table  4 displays  summary  statistics of the term premia  for Argentina  and  Hong
Kong. The table shows that on average  the term premium is positive. It is  also larger for
Argentina  than  for  Hong  Kong,  suggesting  that  markets  are  more  uncertain  about  the
long-run viability of Argentina's peg than that of Hong Kong.
The table  also  shows  that  the  term  premium  is typically  larger  in  tranquil  as
opposed  to  turbulent periods.  Indeed,  at  times  of extreme  turbulence  - such  as  those
corresponding  to  the  economy  minister  resignations  in  2001  in  Argentina  and  the
subsequent  cut  in  international  financing  - the  term  premium  becomes  negative,
particularly  in the  case  of the  Argentine  NDF,  for  which  the  1-month  over  12-month
differential  reached a peak of 11,720 basis  points.  In the  case of Hong Kong,  the mean
term premium is negative during the Mexican crisis and the beginning of the Asian crisis.
The term  premium  reached  large  negative  numbers  during  each  of the  different  crisis
episodes,  hitting 1,854  basis points during the first attack  on the Hong Kong dollar.  The
mean term premium  is positive during the subsequent attacks  because the negative values
only last for a few days.
Market  participants  closely  follow  these  inversions  in  the  term  premium.
Investment banks tend to recommend trades according to the slope of the yield curve and
28their assessments  of risks at different horizons.' 9 This behavior of the term  structure also
echoes  bond market evidence  that  the  slope of the yield curve  changes  from positive to
negative  when markets perceive  a higher default probability;  see for example Gavin and
Kulesz (2000).
IV. Determinants of the currency premium and its term structure
We  turn to  an empirical  analysis  of the deterninants  of the  currency premium.
Our objective  is to identify the impact of economic  variables  as well as  local  and global
events  on  the premium.  Data  constraints  force  us to  limit  the  econometric  analysis  to
Argentina.  The  primary reason  is  the unavailability  of daily  domestic  financial  data  for
Hong Kong with an adequate  time coverage.  Here we focus  on the NDF-based premium
measure.  In the  appendix below  we examine  in depth the observed  differential  between
the NDF and the premium implied by interbank interest rates.
The starting point for the econometric  analysis  is equation  (I1])  above,  rearranged
to read
fd, k  = (ASe,  + errpkt)-  (13)
We  can  further  decompose  anticipated  depreciation  Aes  into  the  subjective probability
held  at  time  t  of a  depreciation  happening  prior  to  t+k, that  we  denote  P,k,  and  the
magnitude  of the depreciation,  that we denote  by  (s,k - s,). With probability  1- P',k  the
exchange  rate stays  unchanged  at its current  level  st  through time t-k.  s,
5 t  is the log of
19  For example, one can find in major financial  newsletters many phrases like "The NDF yield curve has
flattened again.  We see these periodic  inversions  as opportunities  to add to long peso positions  in the
short end."
29the  spot  exchange  rate  expected  to prevail  at  time  t+k if a  devaluation  should  occur
between times t and t+k Thus from (13) we have:
fdt,k  F,k (Sk - s,)+errp,k.  (14)
The  next  step  is  to  relate  the  anticipated  magnitude  of the  depreciation,  the
subjective  devaluation  probability,  and  the  risk  premium  to  observable  counterparts.
Starting with the first of these, the most common approach in the literature is to relate the
anticipated  devaluation  to some measure  of real misalignment  of the currency,  typically
summarized  by the  departure  of the  real  exchange  rate  from  some  equilibrium  value.
However,  we  will  be  working  with daily  data,  and no  information  on  prices  or real
variables  exists  at  such frequency.  Since  we will  be using a  relatively  short period,  it
might be reasonable  to assume that there is little variation in the magnitude of the peso's
perceived  real  misalignment  over the sample  period,  beyond what can be  captured by  a
time trend.  Thus,  we include  a linear trend in our basic  specification.  Nevertheless,  we
also  experiment  with  a  proxy  for  real  exchange  rate  misalignment  available  from
Goldman  Sachs, which  is constructed  on the basis of lower-frequency  real and  financial
data and then interpolated  to yield daily observations. 20 Finally,  we also allow an impact
of the Brazilian  devaluation  of 1999  on the perceived  degree  of peso misalignment,  by
adding a dummy variable (see below).
As  for the subjective  probability  of devaluation,  we  assume that  it is  inversely
related  to  the  stock  of  international  reserves  relative  to  total  bank  deposits,  which
20  To  construct  a  measure  of the foreign  exchange  misalignment,  Goldman  Sachs uses  deviations  of an
estimated  equilibrium  exchange  rate  (called  GSDEEMER)  from  observed  trade-weighted  real
exchange  rates.  To  obtain  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate,  Goldman  Sachs  uses  various  economic
fundamentals  such  as terms of trade, government  consumption,  total  factor productivity,  and capital
flows,  among others.  See Goldman Sachs (1999).
30provides a measure  of the  ability of the currency  board to deter  a run on the Argentine
peso or on the banking  system. Thus,  this variable  is a proxy for the sustainability of the
convertibility  system.  Furthermore,  we  are  interested  in  assessing  the  role  of foreign
reserves  taking  the  form  of hard-currency  assets  vis-a-vis  those  in  the  form  of public
sector  debt,  which  are  also  permitted  by Argentina's  regulations  but  are viewed  with
some  suspicion  by international  investors.  Hence  we  also present  regressions  allowing
these two components of reserves  to carry different coefficients.
To  capture  the  risk  premium  component  of  (14),  we  use  measures  that reflect
markets'  perceptions  about  risk.21 The first  one is the  EMBI  spread for  Latin American
debt  (excluding Argentina's),  which we  take as  a measure  of the perceived riskiness  of
Latin  American  assets in general.  The  second  is the premium  on U.S.  high-yield  assets,
which we take as a measure of international investors'  overall "appetite  for risk." In our
basic  specification,  these  two  variables  capture  the  risk  perceptions  of international
investors.  In addition, we also present some experiments  adding in the regression the risk
rating of Argentine foreign currency debt as determined by major international risk-rating
agencies.22
To these proxies  for international  investors'  risk perceptions,  we also  add in  our
basic specification  the liquidity  position of Argentine  banks,  as reflected  in the ratio  of
their cash reserves to total deposits, that we take as a summary measure of banks' attitude
towards  risk. An  increase  in  financial  volatility  (i.e.,  the risk perceived  by banks)  or an
21  This  is in the spirit of Lewis (1995).
22  Specifically, we use the average  of the risk ratings  of the three leading  agencies: Moody's,  Standard and
Poor's,  and Fitch-IBCA.  We assign numerical values to the  various risk categories  considered by each
agency,  and  average  them  over  their  respective  ratings  for  Argentina's  sovereign  foreign-currency
debt.
31increase  in  their  risk  aversion  should  be  reflected  in  the banks'  decision  to  maintain
higher liquidity ratios.
It is important to emphasize that, as already stated, the literature offers no definite
prediction  regarding  the  sign  of the  impact  of these  risk  preference  proxies  on  the
exchange  risk premium.  However,  simulation  exercises  tend  to suggest  that higher risk
aversion increases the absolute magnitude of the premium.23 Thus, one might expect that
if the peso is regarded as riskier than the U.S. dollar (so that the risk premium is positive)
then higher risk  aversion  would  yield  a larger  risk premium  and,  other things  equal,  a
larger currency premium,  so that the risk aversion proxies just listed would carry positive
coefficients in the regression.
This  argument,  however,  is  subject  to two caveats  in the  case  of the U.S.  high-
yield spread, which may capture other forces at play,  in addition to investors'  overall risk
appetite.  The first caveat arises  from the fact that the perceived riskiness of U.S. junk and
Argentine  assets  may  move  in  different  directions,  reflecting  investors'  substitution
among  alternative  assets.  For  example,  a  shift  out of U.S.  high-yield  assets  and  into
emerging-market  (including Argentine)  assets could result in an a higher premium for the
former  but  lower  for  the  latter.  The  second  caveat  concerns  the  role  of the high-yield
spread as a predictor of the U.S. business cycle. As has been amply documented,  a higher
spread indicates the anticipation of a growth slowdown in the U.S.,  and conversely  for a
lower  spread.  To  the  extent  that  the  U.S.  dollar  tends  to  appreciate  in  booms  and
depreciate  in  slowdowns,  an  increase  in  the  U.S.  high-yield  spread  could  signal  an
impending depreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies,  and thereby an anticipated
23 See for example Evans and Kenc (2001).
32reduction  in  the degree  of overvaluation  of the Argentina peso  in trade-weighted  terms,
which ceteris  paribus  would tend to reduce the forward discount on the peso. Conversely,
a reduction  in the high-yield  spread would imply larger peso  overvaluation in the  future
and thereby lead to a larger forward discount.  Through this channel,  changes in the high-
yield spread could cause changes  in the forward discount in the opposite direction.
Finally, we  also estimate  additional  specifications  including  dummy variables  to
control  for  the  effects  of  the  domestic  and  foreign  political  and  economic  events
summarized  in Section III. To limit the number of dummy variables,  we combine  the two
external shocks  in our sample  (the  periods  of Russian  crisis  and the  devaluation of the
Brazilian real identified  in Table  2) into  a single  "external  shock"  dummy, and likewise
combine  the various  domestic crises  episodes  in Table  2  into  a single  "internal  shock"
dummy.
Some  considerations  regarding  econometric  technique  are  necessary.  Regarding
the time-series  properties  of the data,  preliminary  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF) tests
of unit roots yielded mixed results.  Forward premia were  found to be I(O) - in agreement
with the results of, e.g.,  Clarida and Taylor (1993) - while  for other variables  the results
varied depending on sample size and lag length. This is unsurprising given the short-time
coverage  of our  sample,  which surely results  in very  low power of the  tests and makes
them rather  uninformative.  Since  our  regressors  are  basically  interest  rate  spreads  and
financial  ratios,  we follow  the views  expressed  by Cochrane  (1991)  and  proceed under
the assumption that they are all stationary.
A second  consideration  regards  the potential  endogeneity  of the  right-hand  side
variables.  The domestic financial ratios (the central bank's foreign assets and banks'  cash
33reserves relative to deposits)  are publicly announced  with a 3-day delay;  hence we take
these  variables  as  predetermined.  Next,  we take  the high-yield  spread to be  exogenous.
Finally,  the  Latin  American  EMBI  spread  that  we  use  refers  to  region-wide  assets
excluding  Argentina, 24 and  as  a  working  hypothesis  we  shall  assume  it  exogenous  as
well.25
The third issue refers  to dynamics.  To allow  for some degree  of persistence,  we
use a dynamic  specification  including lags of the dependent and  independent  variables.
Our starting point follows  along the lines of Hendry's GUM (general unrestricted  model)
specification:
k
yf=co + 2  b  jxjr,-f  + ±a,y, 1 + u,.  (15)
j=l  r=o  i=l
This  is just an unrestricted  autoregressive-distributed  lag  (ARDL) model  of order (p,  q).
With some straightforward manipulations, it can be rewritten as
k  q-l  p-I  k
Ay  =+EBrAXj  E  A/i  Ayt-,  +  co  +lXtYt_0  X+a 1 +  . (16)
j=l  r=0  i=l  i=I
The term in square brackets  in the right-hand  side of (16)  captures the "long-run" version
q
of  (15).  Here  a=,  a  -1  and  6j=  bj,are  the  sums  of  coefficients  on  the
dependent and independent variables,  respectively.  The long-run impact of regressorj on
y can be found as  - i
a,
24 Specifically,  it is a weighted  average of the EMBIs from  individual  Latin American  countries excluding
Argentina, with  1999 GDP weights.
25  We are  well  aware  that developments  regarding  the perceived  solvency  of Argentina  might  impact on
that  of other  countries  in  the  region.  However,  we  presume  this  effect  to  be  smaller  than  the  one
operating in the opposite direction,  namely the impact of the region as a whole on Argentina.
34In  the empirical  implementation,  we  estimate  (16)  by OLS  setting p=q=4,  i.e.,
including four lags  of the dependent  and independent variables  (beginning  with lag 3 in
the case  of the  domestic  financial  ratios).  To  save  space  in the  tables  below  we  only
report the long-run coefficients  a,  and  8j  and omit the dynamics.
To  complement  these  OLS regressions,  we  also perform  additional  estimations
allowing  for  conditionally  heteroskedastic  disturbances,  which  are  fairly  common  in
high-frequency  financial  data  such as ours. Indeed,  Tables  1 and 4 above  clearly suggest
that  volatility  of  the  premium  and  its  term  structure  change  over  time,  becoming
noticeably  higher  at  times  of  internal  and  external  crises.  While  OLS  estimates  of
equation (16)  remain consistent in the presence  of heteroskedasticity,  and our inferences
are  based  on  robust  covariance  matrix  estimates,  efficiency  gains  are  possible  by
explicitly  modeling  heteroskedasticity.  In  particular,  we  use  the  exponential  GARCH
(EGARCHr)  specification  of Nelson (1991), which can be written as
loo,  '  N  M  l
0ogf'=°  + y  . logo2  +  Eg  V2,j  l-  Elv  Jr3fJV-j  (
j=J  j=1  j=1
where  v,=  'a  . In  the  estimations  reported  below  we  use  N=M=1.  Compared  with
standard  GARCH,  this specification  offers the  added  flexibility of allowing  asymmetric
effects  on volatility of positive and negative disturbances  (which arise when the  if3 j  are
not zero),  a feature that has proven useful  in modeling financial  asset prices (e.g.,  Pagan
and  Schwert  1990).  Moreover,  the  EGARCH  model  is  computationally  simpler  than
standard  GARCH,  which  is  a major  concern  given our  relatively  short  sample  and  our
specification with several regressors and multiple lags. Indeed,  to achieve  convergence  of
the EGARCH  estimates  we were  forced to employ  a somewhat  shorter lag specification
35in order to preserve sample size.  In particular,  we omitted lags beyond the fourth one,  so
that for the domestic financial  ratios (foreign reserves and bank liquidity), available with
a three-day delay, we used only the third and fourth lag.
Table  5 reports  regression results with the 1-month  NDF premium as dependent
variable. The first five columns report OLS estimates of equation (1  6), while the last two
columns  present  EGARCH(l,l)  estimates  of (16)  and  (17).  As  already  noted,  to  save
space only the long-run coefficients of (16)  appear in the table.
The  first  column  presents  the  basic  specification.  As  expected,  we  find  that
foreign reserves  have  a negative  and significant  effect on  the premium.  Among  the risk
proxies,  the  Latin  EMBI  spread  carries  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient,  and  the
same applies  to domestic banks'  liquidity ratio. In turn, the U.S. high-yield  spread has no
significant  effect,  nor  does  the  time  trend  intend  to  capture  peso  misalignment.  The
summary statistics  at the bottom of the table show that the estimated  equation has a high
explanatory  power,  as  reflected  by  an  R-squared  in  excess  of  .40,  which  is  rather
satisfactory  given that we are working  with daily data. Finally, the Q statistics  reveal no
symptoms of autocorrelation.
Column  2  in  Table  5  replaces  the  time  trend  with  the  Goldman  Sachs
misalignment  proxy.  This  results  in  the  loss  of 20  observations  for  which  the  latter
variable  is not available.  Its coefficient  estimate  carries  a positive  sign, as expected,  but
the  precision  of the  estimate  is  very  poor.  The  remaining  estimates  are  qualitatively
similar to those  in the first column.  In turn, column 3 breaks  down foreign reserves  into
their  hard-currency  and  public-debt  components.  We  find  that  only  hard-currency
reserves have  a significant negative  impact on the  forward premium; bond reserves carry
36a  negative  coefficient  as  well,  but  statistically  not  different  from  zero.  The  other
parameters are very similar to those in column  1.
In column 4 we add to the regressors the risk rating of Argentine  foreign currency
debt,  averaged over the three major rating services. As constructed,  a higher value of the
variable  denotes  a better rating (i.e.,  lower risk).  Its coefficient  estimate  is  negative  and
significant,  as  expected.  Now,  however,  the  coefficient  on  the  foreign  reserve/deposit
ratio becomes much  smaller and insignificant.  This  is very likely a reflection  of the  fact
that  rating  agencies  view  foreign  reserves  as  one  (or  the)  key  factor  in  their  risk
assessment.  The  remaining  estimates  are  similar  to  those  in the  basic  specification  of
column  1. Next,  in columnn 5 we add the internal and external shock dummies. Both carry
positive and significant  (at the  10 percent  level in the case of the external shock dummy)
coefficients,  which  confirms  the  finding  in Table  1 that the  forward  discount  typically
rises at times of turmoil. Interestingly,  the coefficients  on the Latin EMBI spread and the
foreign  reserve  ratio  show  a  considerable  decline  in  magnitude  relative  to  the  basic
specification,  and the former becomes  insignificant.  This is  a clear reflection of the fact
that  the Russia and  Brazil  shocks  summarized  in the "external  shock"  dummy  are  also
reflected in major swings in the  EMBI, while both internal and external  shocks typically
resulted  in reserve  losses.  Hence  the  event  dummies  capture  some  of the  explanatory
power of these two economic variables.
In  column  5 we  are  allowing  for  crises  to  affect  the  conditional  mean  of the
forward premium but not its conditional  variance.  From Table  1, however,  we know that
the  volatility of the premium  is considerably  larger at  times  of shocks.  We allow  for a
time-varying conditional variance by introducing EGARCH effects  in columns 6 and 7 of
37Table 5. As  already noted, we  had to use a somewhat reduced dynamic  specification to
preserve  sample  size and  achieve  convergence  of the estimation procedure.  As  a result,
the sample underlying these estimates  is larger than those used in the OLS regressions.  In
addition, we further simplified the specification in column 5 by combining the two shock
dummies into a single "crisis dummy."
Column  6  presents  an  EGARCH(l, 1) specification  allowing  for  the  effect  of
crises  on the conditional  mean  of the  premium.  Qualitatively,  the estimates are  broadly
similar to those in column  5,  although their magnitudes  change  somewhat reflecting  the
change  in sample.  We  continue  to  find  significant  positive  effects  on  the premium  of
banks'  liquidity ratio and the  crisis  dummy,  and negative  and significant  effects  of the
foreign  reserve  ratio.  The  Latin EMBI  spread  remains  insignificant  like  in column  5.
Now, however,  we also find a significant positive impact of the high-yield spread and the
time  trend  that  proxies  for  misalignment.  The  GARCH  parameters  are  strongly
significant as well, and in particular they suggest an asymmetric  effect of disturbances  on
the conditional  variance, with negative disturbances raising the conditional  variance more
than  positive ones.  The  Box-Pierce  statistics,  however,  suggest  some mild  evidence  of
residual autocorrelation.26
In  column  7  we  expand  the  EGARCH  specification  to  allow  also  for  an
independent effect of crises  on the conditional  variance.  We do this by adding the crisis
dummy in the variance equation.27 This causes  some changes  in the parameter  estimates
relative to those in the preceding column.  In particular,  the EMBI spread is now positive
26 Note that the Q statistics in columns  6-7 refer to the "scaled"  residuals denoted by v in equation (17).
27  We thank Sebastian  Edwards  for making this  suggestion.  See  Edwards  and  Susmel  (2001)  for a  more
sophisticated application of GARCH  models with regime switches.
38and  significant,  and the high-yield  spread reverses  sign - it now  carries  a negative  and
significant  coefficient.  Foreign reserves  and banks'  liquidity remain significant,  although
their parameters  become  much  smaller than  in the preceding  column.  The  crisis dummy
continues  to have a significant positive  impact on the premium  and, in addition, now it is
found  to  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on  the  conditional  variance  as  well.  There
continues to be strong evidence  of EGARCH effects, but the estimates do not suggest any
asymmetric  effects  of disturbances  anymore.  Finally,  the Q  statistics  do not  reveal  any
symptoms of autocorrelation.
Table  6  turns  to  estimation  of  the  determinants  of the  NDF  term  premium,
measured by the difference between the  12-month and  1-month premia.  In addition to the
explanatory  variables in the preceding  table, we introduce  also  the term premium of U.S.
interest rates of similar maturity,  to provide  a benchmark  for the term premium generally
demanded by investors.
Like in the previous table, columns  1 to 5 reports OLS regressions, while columns
6-7 report EGARCH  estimates, using the same array of specifications  as before.  Column
1 presents  the  basic  specification.  We  find  that  the  foreign  reserves  to  deposits  ratio
exerts  a  significant  positive  effect  on  the  term  premium,  suggesting  that  the
announcement  of higher  reserves  reduces  more  the  short-term  NDF  premium  than the
longer-term  one.  This  likely  reflects  the  fact  that higher  reserves  lower  the  perceived
probability of immediate devaluation  relative  to the probability  of eventual devaluation.
On the  other hand,  the liquidity ratio of banks carries a negative  sign, which suggests that
banks'  decision  to  hold  larger  cash reserves  relates  more  to perceived  short-term  risks
than  long-term  ones.  The  remaining  coefficient  estimates  are  insignificant.  The
39explanatory power of the equation is  quite high,  as reflected by its R-squared of .46, and
the residuals show no signs of serial correlation.
Column 2 uses the Goldman Sachs misalignment proxy.  Like in the regressions of
the  1-month premium,  its coefficient estimate is positive but highly imprecise.  Column 3
disaggregates  foreign  reserves  into  hard-currency  and  public-debt  assets.  Both  carry
significant positive coefficients,  but that of bond reserves is much smaller and significant
only  at  the  10  percent  level.  This  suggests  that  the  impact just described  of foreign
reserves  on perceived  devaluation  probabilities  at  different  horizons  is  mostly  due  to
hard-currency reserves.
Column  4  adds  to  the  basic  specification  the  risk  rating  of foreign-currency
Argentine  debt.  Like  with the  1-month  premium,  the  main  consequence  is  to  render
foreign reserves  insignificant,  confirming  the interpretation  given earlier that risk ratings
are strongly affected by foreign reserve holdings. Column 5 adds the internal and external
shock  dummies.  Both  carry  significantly  negative  coefficients,  in  accordance  with  the
fact  noted  earlier  that  the  term  structure  tends  to  become  inverted  at  times  of crisis.
Introducing  the dummies  also  causes  some changes  in other  parameters.  Most notably,
the high-yield  spread  becomes  significant  at the  10  percent  level  with  a negative  sign,
while foreign reserves  become insignificant.
Columns 6 and 7 report EGARCH  estimates, restricting as before the lag length of
the domestic financial ratios in the estimated  specifications - in order to conserve  sample
size - and combining  the two crisis  dummies  into  a single  one.  In  column  6, the crisis
dummy  affects  only  the  conditional  mean  of  the  term  premium.  Like  in  the  OLS
estimates of column 5, the dummy carries  a negative and significant coefficient.  The sign
40pattern  of the remaining  coefficients  is  similar to  that  in  column  5. Now,  however,  all
regressors,  except  for  the  high-yield  spread,  carry  significant  parameter  estimates  -
positive  in  the case of the U.S.  term  structure,  the EMBI  spread  and the  foreign  reserve
ratio, and negative  for the liquidity ratio of banks. There is strong indication of EGARCH
effects,  including  significant  asymmetry  that  results  in positive  disturbances  increasing
the conditional  variance more than negative  ones. The Q  statistics  do not reveal residual
autocorrelation.  However,  the autoregressive  parameter  in the variance  equation  is close
to  unity,  suggesting  that  the  variance  process  is  close  to  an  integrated  EGARCH
(EEGARCH).
Column 7  adds  the crisis  dummy  also  in the conditional  variance  equation.  It  is
found to exert  a positive and highly significant  effect,  confirming  the finding in  Table 4
above  that volatility  of the term premium rises  at times of major shocks.  The remaining
estimates  show  very little  change  relative  to those  in column  6,  and  they all continue  to
be  highly  significant  with  the  exception  of the  high-yield  spread.  We  again  find  a
strongly asymmetric  impact of disturbances  on the  conditional variance,  but now there is
much  less  evidence  of  IEGARCH  effects.  The  residuals  display  no  symptoms  of
autocorrelation.
V. Conclusions
Emerging  economies  typically  show  positive  interest  rate  differentials  vis-a-vis
industrial economies.  They reflect two ingredients:  the country premium and the currency
premium.  While  the  former has been  studied  in depth by the recent literature,  the latter
has  received  much  less  empirical  attention,  probably  due  to  lack  of  adequate  data.
41Nevertheless,  the  currency premium has attracted  considerable  interest in the debate on
the choice of exchange rate regime  for emerging  countries,  as well as in the analysis of
target  zones  and  covered  interest  parity,  both  of  which  focus  mainly  on  developed
countries.
In this paper we have characterized  the behavior of the currency premium for two
currency boards that have been able to maintain  a hard peg to the U.S. dollar for a very
long time.  Several interesting  findings emerge from the paper, and some puzzles are  left
open for future research.  They can be summarized in five main points.
First,  despite  the  presumed  rigidity  of  the  peg  underlying  currency  boards,
currency  premia  tend  to  be  uniformly  positive,  suggesting  that  markets  persistently
anticipate  a  devaluation  of the exchange rate.  We find very  few instances  in which  the
currency premium is negative.  This raises the question of whether currency boards really
yield sufficient credibility as to minimize currency risk. Of course, to answer the question
one  would  need  to  examine  also  the  currency  premium  under  other  exchange  rate
regimes; perhaps  that observed  under currency boards is consistently lower than in other
regimes.  But in any  case the implication  is that  even full backing of the monetary  base
does  not suffice to eliminate  currency risk. The ensuing question is whether dollarization
offers the only road to achieve that end.
Second,  political  and  economic  events  seem  to  be  important  factors  in  the
behavior  of currency  premia.  The  currency premium  in Argentina  increased  during the
Mexican,  Asian,  Russian,  and  Brazil  crises.  Moreover,  several political  and economic
events  - such as the crisis ignited in March  2001  - had a large impact on the premium.
42Regarding  Hong Kong, the currency premium  increased significantly during the Mexican
crisis, the Asian crisis and, especially,  during the attacks on the Hong Kong dollar.
In a related paper we have argued that it is easier  for currency regimes to achieve
credibility  when they  are easily verifiable  by available  data.28 In this paper we find  that
Argentine  markets  reacted negatively  to  the  announcement  of a proposal  to replace  the
simple  dollar  peg  underlying  the  convertibility  system  with  a basket peg  composed  of
U.S.  dollars  and euros.  The  immediate  result was  a jump  in the  currency premium,  as
markets  perceived the peso  to be riskier rather than  more  stable  as the  government had
intended.  This is  also consistent  with the evidence  found during the management  of the
Mexican  crisis. When  the government  took measures  to reinforce  the  existing  currency
board,  markets  welcomed  those  moves.  But  any actions  viewed  as  departures  from  the
rigid currency board generated a negative reaction among investors.29
Third,  the yield  curve  of currency  premia tends  to  slope upward,  but  invariably
flattens  out  or  turns  negative  at  the  peak  of crises.  This  is  consistent  with  previous
research that has found short-term premia  to be more  volatile than long premia,  and can
be  explained  by several  factors.  During  financial  turmoil,  markets  may  revise  upward
their perceived probability of immediate collapse  of the regime more than the probability
of eventual  collapse, and/or may anticipate an overshooting of the exchange rate after the
collapse.  Furthermore,  fluctuations  in  the  term  structure  might  also  reflect  different
liquidity  in the  short-  and  long-term  markets.  These  fluctuations  in term  premia  imply
that one needs  to proceed with care  when comparing  interest  rate differentials,  currency
premia,  and country premia of different  maturities.  A remaining question  is whether this
28 See Frankel, Fajnzylber,  Schmukler, and Serven (2001).
43seemingly  predictable  behavior  of term premia  generates  opportunities  for arbitrage.  It
certainly prompts investors to take speculative bets.
Fourth,  we  find  that  prices  of currency  risk  differ  across  markets.  The  spread
between  the  forward  discount  and  the currency  premium  derived  from both  interbank
currency and deposit rates tends to be positive, and increases  substantially during times of
financial  turbulence.  This  finding  admits  different  interpretations.  It  might  reflect  a
failure  of covered  interest  parity  that  leaves  unexploited  arbitrage  opportunities.  In
principle,  domestic  banks  could  arbitrage  them away,  but  anecdotal  evidence  suggests
that at  times  of financial  stress  banks  prefer to  protect their  liquidity  and  refrain  from
cross-market arbitrage.  Alternatively,  it is also possible that heterogeneity across markets,
reflected  in different pricing of the same risk, cannot be arbitraged due to the existence of
large transaction  costs.  In the Argentine case,  however,  formal transaction  costs  are not
large in the markets we analyze,  and they  are unlikely to get much larger during crises -
although  bid-ask  spreads  can  certainly  increase  at  times of high  volatility.  Finally,  the
two  measures  of the  currency  premium  might  involve  risks  not  considered  in  most
analyses,  such as differential default risk in the  exchange and money markets. While our
approach  focuses  on  what we  have  labeled strict covered  interest parity,  and hence  the
cross-market  differentials that we construct are  free from country premia, we cannot rule
out  this  possibility.  Thus,  without  detailed  information  on  market transactions  it  is not
possible to disentangle  this puzzle, whose resolution remains open to future research.
Fifth,  in the  case of Argentina  we find  that domestic  and  foreign monetary  and
financial  factors  related  to  risk  perceptions  and  anticipations  of  devaluation  exert  a
29  See Ganapoisky and Schmukler (2001).
44systematic  effect on the currency  premium  and its term  structure.  Risk related  to EMBI
spreads,  as well  as  that captured by standard  risk ratings,  have  in most cases  a positive
effect  on  currency  premia.  Reserves  - especially  hard-currency  reserves,  more  than
government-bond  reserves  - have  a negative  impact  on currency  premia,  and a positive
one on the term premium.  The liquidity position of the financial  sector, which reflects  the
risk perceived by financial  institutions, affects  positively currency  premia and negatively
the  term  premium.  Finally,  adverse  domestic  and  external  events  that  threaten  the
sustainability of the convertibility  system raise  the currency premium and tend to invert
its term structure.
In this  paper  we have  made  some progress  towards  understanding  the  currency
premium,  and  we  have  also  raised  new  puzzles.  It  would  be  useful  to know  whether
similar  facts  and  puzzles  emerge  for  other  countries  and  other  currency  regimes.
Preliminary  research  suggests  that  this  is  the  case,  but the  question  remains  open  for
future work.
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50Appendix: The cross-market currency premium differential
This  appendix  investigates  the  differences  in  the  currency  premium  across
instrunents in the case of Argentina.  Specifically,  we study the deviations  from the strict
version  of covered  interest  parity,  as  reflected  by  the  difference  between the  currency
premium implied  by the NDF  and  that implied  by interbank  offer  (or  lending)  interest
rates. The interbank market is the most liquid onshore/domestic  money market.
We first analyze  the  different  factors behind  the cross-market  currency premium
differential.  Specifically,  we analyze  the influence of transaction costs and default risk as
potential  explanations  for  the  failure of covered  interest  parity.  Then  we  study whether
the evidence suggests unexploited arbitrage  opportunities  exist, by assessing the  speed of
convergence  of the cross-market differential to non-arbitrage levels.
A.1 Transaction costs and the cross-market currency premium differential
In  a  world  of  perfectly  integrated  markets  with  no  restrictions  on  capital
movements,  covered arbitrage would equalize the discount in the forward market with the
currency  premium  implied  by  interest  rates.  However,  the  textbook  case  of covered
interest parity ignores various types of transaction costs that tend to segment the markets.
A large empirical literature, originated in the  1970s and 1980s,  focuses on testing covered
interest parity after taking  into account  such  transaction  costs, and examines  alternative
ways to do arbitrage.30
30  Much of this  literature  focuses  on  identifying  "neutral"  bands taking  into account  various  transactions
costs involved  in arbitrage operations.  For example,  Frenkel  and Levich (1977) consider:  (i) costs  of
selling (buying) a domestic security;  (ii) costs of buying (selling) spot the  foreign currency; (iii) costs
of buying (selling)  a foreign  security; and (iv) the transactions  costs of forward  coverage.  In addition,
other  papers  (e.g.,  Blenman  1991)  consider  differentials  between  borrowing  and  lending rates  and
introduce  heterogeneous  arbitrageurs.  Some  researchers  have used offshore Euromarket rates for these
.51Here  we  consider three  different arbitrage  scenarios.  The  first one  assumes  that
the  arbitrageur  has  "own"  funds.  In  such  case,  she  will simply  compare  the  currency
premium in the foreign exchange  rate market and in the money market.  The second and
third  scenarios  assume  that the  arbitrageur  does not  have funds, and hence  she  needs  to
borrow  in one  currency  and lend  in  the other currency  to perform the  arbitrage.  In  this
case, the relevant deposit and lending rates need to be considered.
It is important to note that, in each case, there is some risk involved,  so there is no
pure arbitrage  in a strict sense - gains can be realized but at the expense of taking some
risks.  These have  received  only  limited attention  in the  literature,  however,  and thus  in
each of the scenarios below we highlight the specific risks involved.3'
Case 1. Arbitrageur with funds
If the  arbitrageur  has  funds  invested  in  the  domestic  banking  sector,  she  will
compare  the interbank  rates with the forward discount.  If the forward discount is greater
than the interest rate differential,  investors with peso assets will  switch their investment
to a  dollar investment  and buy pesos  in the  forward  market.  If the forward  discount  is
smaller  than the  interest  rate  differential,  investors  with dollar  assets  will  switch their
investment  to peso assets  and buy dollars  in the  forward market.  If the arbitrageur  is  a
financial institution,  the relevant rates are lending rates.  Otherwise,  the relevant  rates  are
deposit  rates.  A  similar  analysis  can  be  performed  from  the  borrowers'  side.  Hence
arbitrage  yields  two  covered  parity conditions  - one  for deposit rates  and  another  for
lending rates:
tests,  in  addition  to  the  more  commonly  used  onshore  domestic  currency  rates.  See  also  Clinton
(1988).
31In all  three cases we  assume that  the  bid-ask  spread  in  the forward  market is  negligible.  If the  spread
were significantly different  from zero, the parity conditions would need modification to reflect  it.
52(liending  - ilending,*)= fd  (idePosit  _idepsit,* ).  (Al)
Thus, if arbitrageurs  possessed sufficient funds, they would equalize the currency premia
in all three markets.
Note  that this  arbitrage  might  not be risk  free,  since  loans  and  deposits may be
subject to default risk. In particular, borrowers  might be more likely to repay loans in one
currency - typically the local currency  - than in the  other,  as already noted  in Section II
above.
Case 2.  Arbitrageur  without  funds:  borrow  and deposit  in the  same  (domestic)
market.
The  arbitrage  in  Case  1 might  fail  to  equalize  the  currency  premium  across
markets  if arbitrageurs  lack  sufficient  funds,  since  in  general  they  may not be  able  to
short  deposits.  In  such  case,  an  alternative  form  of arbitrage  may  be  possible.  If the
currency premium implied from the forward  market is greater  than the one implied from
interest rates, the arbitrageur takes a peso loan at the interest rate  i 7 "ding,  sells pesos spot
and deposits  the resulting  dollar  amount  in the domestic  market  at the rate  idePosi  . To
cover the position, the arbitrageur  buys pesos in the forward market. In the opposite case,
if the currency  premium  implied  from  the  forward  market  is  smaller  than  that implied
from the interest  rates, the arbitrageur  does the reverse operation.  She borrows in dollars
and makes  a deposit  in pesos,  buying  dollars  in the forward  market.  According  to this
type of arbitrage, the forward discount lies between  two bands
(i"'ding  -deposit,)  fd_  k  (idep  _  -l  eding,  )  (A2)
upper band  lower band
53This arbitrage  might impose some risk as well,  because  the arbitrageur  deposits
the loan in the domestic fmancial  system.  If the domestic bank fails, the arbitrageur  may
still be liable for the loan she took, even though the bank does not return her own deposit.
The arbitrage in case 3 avoids in part this risk.
Case 3. Arbitrageur without  funds: borrow in one market and deposit in the other
market.
The  arbitrage  in  this  case  is  similar  to  the  one  in  case  2,  but  the  arbitrageur
deposits  the  dollar  value  of the  peso  loan  in  the  offshore  market  when  the  currency
premium  implied  from the  forward market  is greater  than  the one implied  from  interest
rates.  In  the  opposite  case,  when  the  forward  discount  is  smaller  than  the  currency
premium implied from interest rates,  the arbitrageur  borrows  in the offshore market  and
makes  a  deposit  in  a  domestic  bank.  This  type  of arbitrage  implies  that the  forward
discount lies within two bands,
(jending _offshoreidePosf)  fd k  (ideposit  offshore1iendig*f )  (A3)
upper band  lower band
If offshore  deposits  are  less  risky than  onshore  deposits  arbitrage  will probably
take place  when  the forward  discount  is larger  than the upper band,  since this arbitrage
involves  relatively  no  risk.  In  contrast,  when the  forward  discount  is  below the  lower
band  arbitrage  might not  take  place,  because  the  arbitrageur  would  have  to  bear  the
differential risk of the onshore bank.  The arbitrageur would need to contract  a liability in
the offshore  market and absorb the onshore risk.
54A.II Default risk and the cross-market currency premium differential
Even  onshore  instruments  issued  by  the  same  borrower  in  different  currencies
may pose different  default risks - e.g., default  probabilities  and/or  recovery  ratios in the
event  of default may differ  systematically  across  assets depending  on their currency  of
denomination.  In such case,  the onshore interest differential  (10) would equal the forward
premium  plus  another  term  (positive  or  negative)  reflecting  the  different  default
characteristics  of domestic-  and foreign-currency  denominated instruments.32
As  an  example,  consider  the  case  in  which  domestic  debtors  default  with
probability  l-a  (respectively,  1-a*)  on  their  domestic  (foreign-currency)  one-period
liabilities, whose respective gross yields are R1,1 and R* I , and assume that in the event of
default the  corresponding  recovery  values  are  OR,,  and  9R* 1,j, where  9, 9  <  1. Risk-
neutral  speculation  across  the two assets,  using the  forward  market,33 can  be shown  to
imply
j*)  1+  (1- a)(0 - 0)  (a - a  -a,)
i')=fd,, -tInlI  + a  (la9  +l  *)j  (A4)
Comparing  this  expression  with  (10)  above,  it  is  immediately  apparent  that
covered  interest  parity  fails  to  hold  except  if  a  =a* and  0  =  9*,  i.e.,  when  default
probabilities  and  recovery  ratios  are  identical  across  assets.  Otherwise,  the  observed
interest  rate differential  falls  short  of the  forward  premium  if domestic-currency  assets
32  Note also  that forward  exchange  contracts  themselves may  not be free of counterparty default risk;  see
Hodrick (1987).  As  discussed  in  the  text,  this  risk  is  considerably  smaller  in  the  case  of the non-
deliverable forward  contracts,  which we use  in our empirical  work  here,  than in  the case  of outright
forward contracts.
33  Note that  in this case  forward  arbitrage  is  not risk-free  anymore  due  to the existence  of default risk -
even though it is free  of exchange rate risk.
55entail a lower probability  of default (a  >a*) and/or a higher recovery ratio (9 > 9)  than
foreign-currency  assets.  If the reverse  is true, then the observed interest rate differential
exceeds the forward premium.34
A.III Unexploited  arbitrage opportunities?
We next review in more detail how different markets price currency  risk. First we
assess  whether  the  evidence  from  Argentina  seems  consistent  with  no-arbitrage
opportunities. To do this, Appendix Figure 1 displays three charts. The top panel plots the
1-month  forward  discount  along  with  the  currency  premium  derived  from  1-month
lending and  deposit  rates.  The  middle  panel  plots  the forward  discount  along  with  the
upper and lower bands described in equation (A2), while the bottom panel uses the bands
displayed in equation (A3).
Appendix  Figure  1 shows  that  the  forward  discount  differs  from  the  currency
premium  derived  from  interbank  rates.  For most  of the  sample  the  two  measures  are
roughly similar, but in many instances the forward discount is significantly  different from
the interbank market currency premium. This is especially the case during turbulent times
and  at the  end of the  sample,  when  the forward  discount  becomes  considerably  larger
than the  currency premium derived  from interbank  rates. The  forward  discount has very
few values below the interbank currency premium.
A similar picture is displayed in the middle and lower panels of Appendix Figure
1, corresponding to cases  2 and 3 above.  In these panels the forward discount lies for the
most part within the no-arbitrage  bands. But in some observations,  particularly  at the end
34 On this point, see also Broda and Levy Yeyati (2001).
56of the  sample,  the  forward  discount jumps  above  the upper  band.  As  we  shall  discuss
below,  these  are  not just  one-day  events.  The  lower  panel  uses  offshore  deposit  and
lending rates.  Relative to the middle panel, the bands shift upward because country risk is
not present  in the offshore rates.  These rates  are lower  tharl,  domestic interbank  rates, so
the  differential  shrinks.  Despite the  upward shift  in the band,  the forward  discount  still
lies  above the band during crisis times.  But in this case there exist  a few observations  in
which the forward discount lies below the lower band.
Does  this  evidence  imply that  arbitrage  opportunities  exist?  The  answer  is just
maybe.  There are  three alternative  explanations  for the evidence  founid;  we have already
mentioned two of them.35 One  explanation is that in fact there  are unexploited  arbitrage
opportunities  in the short run and, thus,  covered interest parity fails to hold. The currency
premium  derived  from  the  exchange  market  is  significantly  different  from  the  one
derived  from the  money  market,  and  is  larger than  any  existing  transaction  costs.  For
some reason,  arbitrage does not take place.36
A second  possible  explanation  is that  unobserved  transaction  costs - aside  from
the spread between  lending  and borrowing rates considered  above -- are large enough  to
rule out profitable arbitrage opportunities.  However,  this argument  does not explain why
35  In fact, there  is a  fourth explanation,  which  claims that data  might not be wel) aligned  by time of day.
This can  generate  differences  across markets,  as  shown  by  McCormick  (1979).  In our case,  we  use
closing  daily  data,  which  in  terms  of trading  hours  are  reasonably  aligned.  The  trading  hours  in
Buenos Aires are the same  as those  in New York, while trading hours  in Hong Kong are  similar to
those in other financial  centers in Asia. Given the regularities found in the data for both Argentina and
Hong  Kong,  we  believe  that  lack  of perfect  data  alignment  is  not  explaining  the  cross-market
differences.  We thank Maury Obstfeld  for raising this point.
36  Informal  evidence  gathered  from  market  participants  suggests  that  at  times  of turbulence,  when the
forward  premium  becomes  quite  large,  domestic  banks  refrain  from  getting  involved  in  short-term
arbitrage operations  and prefer  to  "stay  liquid."  While this  is  consistent  with  the  opening  of a  gap
between  the  interbank  and  forward  currency  premia,  the  precise  reasons  for  this  decision  are  not
known to us.
57the different  markets  exhibit  systematically  different currency  premia.  The cross-market
differentials  might reflect  the  action  of heterogeneous  agents,  endowed  with  different
expectations,  in  the various  markets.  In  this  case, the  cross-market  differential  will  lie
within  bounds  determined  by  the  magnitude  of  these  unspecified  transaction  costs,
similarly to (A2) and (A3) above.
In  the  case  of Argentina,  however,  there  are  no  obvious  transaction  costs  to
support  this  explanation.  There  are  no  restrictions  on  capital  movements,  and  local
residents  can operate  in  the  local  and foreign  markets  without  being taxed  on  interest,
dividend,  or  capital  gains.37 Yet  the  fact  that  currency  premia  are  not  equal  across
markets  suggests  that other types of transaction  costs or market imperfections  leading  to
market segmentation  could be responsible for our findings.  For example,  there  could be
large bid-ask spreads unknown to us in the  forward market,38 or it might not be possible
to perfonn  transactions  at quoted prices.  In view of the large  volume  of transactions  in
the NDF market, however, this explanation does not seem very convincing.
A third  possible  explanation  for  our findings  is that  the differences  in  currency
premia  reflect  in  fact  differences  in  other  risks  across  markets.  In  other  words,  the
measures of the currency premium that we (and the rest of the literature) use embed other
types of risks and do not solely measure  "currency risk."  In such  case,  the cross-market
currency premium differential could reflect default risk.  Specifically, borrowers  or banks
37  In  April  2001  a  small  transaction  tax  of 0.2 percent  was  imposed  on  some  financial  transactions  in
Argentina,  what cannot  explain the large  differentials  found before  and after  that date.  In  countries
with substantial  explicit  costs, like capital controls, there  is a wedge between  local and foreign rates,
as shown by Herrera and Valdes (2001) for the case of Chile.
38 Data on bid-ask  spreads  from NDFs are not available.  However,  we were able  to obtain data on bid-ask
spreads from  the peso  spot market.  The  maximum  annualized  spread  from this  market is  240  basis
points. Unless spreads on NDFs are much larger than those on spot transactions,  they will be unable to
58might be more likely to default on dollar loans and deposits than on peso contracts.39 As a
result, the forward discount would exceed the peso-dollar interest differential by a default
premium along the lines of equation (A4) in the text.40
In  sum,  at  one  extreme  the  discrepancy  between  the  forward  discount  and the
currency premium derived  from interbank rates might reflect divergent  expectations that
are not or cannot be arbitraged away.  At the other extreme,  the discrepancy might reflect
the perceived  default risks  in the  interbank market.  Transaction  costs might  also play  a
role. Of course,  it  is also possible that  the three  explanations  are  simultaneously behind
the  cross-market  differentials.  It is difficult  to disentangle  these  alternative  explanations
without much more detailed information on market transactions.
A.IV  Convergence  of the cross-market currency premium differential
Though  we  cannot  detennine  exactly  the  source  of  the  spread  between  the
forward  discount and  the  interbank  currency  premium,  it is  still  interesting  to study  its
behavior,  as  it  provides  information  about  the  differential  behavior  of both  markets.
Formally, we define the spread between the forward and the interbank market as follows
Y,k  -fdftk  -(i,k  i',k).  (A5)
explain the  observed  cross-market differences.  We thank Amadou Sy for generously providing us the
data.
Collin-Dufresne  and Solnik (2001)  describe  a similar case for the swap and LIBOR markets.
40 An alternative version of the same argument would resort to  systematic differences  in default risks
between domestic banks operating  in dollars and those operating in pesos. In Argentina,  however,
virtually all banks borrow and lend in both currencies.
59These  interbank  rates  can be  either lending  or deposit rates.  Here  we shall  work  with
lending rates, since they display much more variability than deposit rates (see Figure 2 in
the text) and hence their behavior resembles more closely that of the NDF premium.
The  literature  on  covered  interest parity has  employed  two  main approaches  to
analyzing this  spread.  The first one  simply takes  the observed  deviations  from covered
interest parity  and  assesses  whether  they frequently exceed  what would be justified by
transaction  costs.  The  second  approach  performs  unit root tests on the covered  interest
differential  to determine  whether non-stationarity  can be rejected;  failure  to reject  non-
stationarity  implies  that  the  covered  differential  persists  indefinitely  and  thus  covered
interest  parity  fails  to  hold.  Still,  even  if non-stationarity  is  rejected  the  covered
differential  may  converge  very  slowly  to  its  mean,  reflecting  persistent  (albeit  not
permanent) failures of covered interest parity.
In our case,  we take  the  case most  favorable  to covered  interest parity - namely
that in which  the arbitrageurs  have no funds  (Cases  2 and 3 above).  We also work with
the onshore rates used in the strict form of covered interest parity described in Section II.
We  then examine the behavior of the  forward discount  relative  to the  no-arbitrage  band
defined by borrowing  and lending rates,  using the band displayed  in the middle panel of
Appendix  Figure  1. For  those observations  where  the  forward  discount  lies  above  the
band,  we examine the dynamics of the differential between  the forward  discount and the
upper band. For the observations  inside the band, we study the dynamics  of the forward
discount.4'
41  Since we have no observations below the lower band,  we ignore this case.
60This approach  is in the spirit of the threshold  autoregression (TAR)  models  used
to study arbitrage  in goods and assets markets.42 These models typically need to estimate
the "commodity points"  or thresholds of no arbitrage.  In our case, however,  the problem
is  simpler  because  the  thresholds  are  known,  and  given  by  the  no-arbitrage  bands  in
Figure Al. Therefore, we estimate the following model:
A(fd1,  - (it k  - ik  c))  "t + 2  d,k  k  -(it  - k  ;-i,k ))+  ek  if  fdI,k  >  (i  -i,k  )(A
Afd1k  C=  + Xfdt,k  + E7'k  if  fd,,k < (it,k  - it  )
Note  that  the  mean  and  the  speed  of  adjustment,  as  well  as  the  variance  of  the
disturbance,  are  allowed to differ across  equations.  Our primary  concern is to assess the
speed of adjustment 2 both within and outside the band.
The top panel  of Appendix Table  1 shows the number of observations  for which
the forward discount lies outside and inside  the no-arbitrage  band. Around 49 percent of
the  observations  are  above  the  no-arbitrage  bands  (345  observations).  The  histogram
displayed  in the table shows  the  distribution of observations  relative  to the upper band.
Negative numbers  represent observations  below  the upper band, while positive  numbers
are  observations  above  the band.  The histogram  shows that the  observations  above  the
band can take very large values - their median exceeds  1,000 basis points.
The  bottom  of Appendix  Table  1 reports  the results  from  estimating  the  TAR
model.  Since the observations  above the upper band clearly become more abundant in the
latter  part of the sample,  we perform  the  estimation  on two  different  samples:  the  full
42  These models have  been used to examine  issues such  as the  validity of purchasing power  parity,  or the
extent of arbitrage under the gold standard.  See for example,  Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Prakash and
Taylor (1997),  Taylor and Peel (2000),  and Taylor,  Peel, and Sarno  (2001).
61sample  of available  data, and  a subsample ending  at the time of the  cut in international
financing (early July 2001).
For  the  observations  outside  the  band  we  can  reject  nonstationarity  of  the
dependent  variable.  The  estimates  reflect reversion  to  the mean.  Interestingly,  for the
observations  inside the band we cannot reject nonstationarity.  The speed of adjustment to
the mean  appears to have  declined  dramatically  after the cut  in international  lending of
July 2001.  This is particularly evident from the half-life of the  differential  [calculated as
ln(0.5)/ln(l+A)]  outside the band, which is  one  and a half day in the restricted  sample
and nearly five days in the full sample.  Hence, departures  from the arbitrage band appear
to have become much more lasting - indeed, much more lasting than should be expected
under perfect arbitrage.
To  conclude,  we  document  the  main  features  of  the  cross-market  currency
premium  differential,  as  a reflection  of unspecified  heterogeneity  across  markets  rather
than  specifically as  a potential  failure  os covered  arbitrage.  Appendix  Figure 2 plots the
1-month  forward-interbank  spread  6,,i,  while  Appendix  Table  2  displays  summary
statistics  of the  spread  for  the  1- and  12-month  maturities.  The  spread  is  on  average
positive, particularly for the  1-month maturity.  But the mean is affected by large positive
values  reaching as high as  11,000 basis points  during the 2001  crisis.  The distribution  is
skewed  to the right,  so that the median  is smaller  than the mean,  but still positive.  It is
noteworthy that all the large  values  take place  during crisis times.  In tranquil times, the
cross-market difference  is  also positive but smaller.  The differential  takes on only a few
negative numbers, reaching at most -200 basis points.
62Figure 1
Currency Premia under Currency Boards
The  figure shows historical  values  of daily currency  premia  in Argentina  (top panel) and Hong Kong (lower panel). The currency premium  for Argentina
is  calculated  as  the spread of local  peso time  deposit rates  over  local U.S.  dollar interbank  deposit rates,  with maturities  up to  2 months.  The currency
premium for Hong  Kong is calculated with  the forward  discount, the forward  exchange  rate minus  the spot exchange  rate,  using  I-month contracts.  The
sample  for Argentina covers the period 4/1/93 -9/25/01,  for Hong Kong it cosers the period  1/4/93 -9/25/01.  All rates  are in basis points, annualized,  and
continuously compounded.
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Alternative of Measures of Currency Premia
The figure  shows  different  measures of currency premia  for Argentina  and Hong  Kong,  using  daily  1-month  interest  rate  premia and  1-month
forward exchange rate discounts. The interest rates used  for Argentina  include the interbank offer rate (BAIBOR), the interbank deposit rate  index
or money market  index (MMR)  consisting of rates paid on  deposits of more than  I million pesos  or  U.S.  dollars,  and the time  deposit rate for
deposits  up to  I million pesos or U.S. dollars.  Both the BAIBOR and the MMR are from Bloomberg  and the time deposit rates were obtained  from
the  Central  Bank of  Argentina.  For each  type  of  rate,  the  currency  premium  for  Argentina  is  measured  by  the  difference  between  the  rate
denominated  in domestic currency and  that in U.S. dollars. The forward  exchange rates  for Argentina  are non-deliverable  forward  (NDF) rates and
the NDF currency premium is measured by the forward discount. NDF forward rates are from two sources:  Deutsche Bank and Bloomberg.
The  interest  rates  used  for Hong  Kong  are interbank  offer  rates (HIBOR),  obtained from  the Hong  Kong  Monetary  Authority.  The  premium  is
obtained over  the U.S.-dollar LIBOR.  The  forward rates used  for Hong  Kong are from Bloomberg and correspond to deliverable  contracts.  All the
rates are annualized,  in basis points,  and continuously compounded.
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Term Structure of Currency Premia
The  figure  shows  the  term  structure  of the  currency  premium  in  Argentina  (top  panel)  and  Hong  Kong  (bottom  panel),  calculated  with  the
difference  between  the  12-month and  the  l-month  currency premium.  For each  country,  the  currency premium is measured  using  both  interbank
offer rates and forward exchange  rates. For Argentina the peso interbank offer premium is obtained with the spread of peso over dollar  denominated
Argentine  interbank offer  rates,  while for Hong Kong the  interbank offer premium  is measured with  the spread of the Hong Kong  interbank offer
rates over  the  U.S.-dollar  LIBOR.  The forward  discounts  are  measured  by  the  spreads  of non-deliverable  forward  (NDF)  exchange  rates,  for
Argentina, and deliverable  forward rates, for Hong Kong, over the spot exchange rate,  respectively.  The  interest rates for Hong-Kong were  obtained
from the Hong Kong  Monetary  Authority and the exchange rates from Bloomberg.  The Argentine  interbank rates are from Bloomberg and the NDF
rates were obtained from Deutchbank  and Bloomberg.  All the rates are annualized,  in basis points, and continuously  compounded.
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History of Currency Premia in Argentina and Hong Kong
Summary Statistics
The table  shows sumnmary statistics  of daily  currency premnia  in  Argentina and  Hong Kong  for  different  samples.  The currency premium  for Argentina  is
calculated as the spread of local  peso time deposit rates over local U.S. dollar interbank deposit rates,  with maturities up to 2 months. The currency premium
for Hong  Kong  is calculated with  the  1-month  forward  discount.  The crisis  periods  for Argentina are the  following:  (i) Mexican  crisis,  (ii) Attack  on the
Hong  Kong  dollar,  (iii)  Russia's  default,  (iv) Devaluation  of the  Brazilian  real,  (v)  Financial  Times  article  and presidential  elections,  (vi)  Vice president
resigns,  (vii)  Changes  of finance  minister,  and  (viii)  Cut  of international  credit.  The  crisis  periods  for  Hong-Kong  are:  (i)  The  Mexican  crisis,  (ii)  the
Financial  distress in KoTea,  (iii) the Attacks  on the Thai baht and the four attacks  on the Hong Kong  dollar.  See text for a description  of all the events. All
rates are in basis points, annualized,  and continuously compounded.




Up to 2  month
Total  04/01/93 - 06/05/01  2,121  211  148  204  1  1,986
Tranquil Periods (after the Mexican  Crisis)  1,228  126  98  97  1  812
Crisis Periods  446  383  252  333  25  1,986
Mexican  crisis  01/10/95 - 04/10/95  63  603  520  243  264  1,316
Attack on the Hong Kong dollar  10/29/97 - 11/26/97  21  223  223  90  83  393
Russia's default  08/19/98 - 10/16/98  42  201  193  69  65  405
Devaluation of the Brazilian  real  01/13/99 -02/12/99  23  210  206  56  97  315
Financial Times article and elections  05/17/99 - 12/17/99  149  186  155  74  88  397
Vice president resigns  10/06/00 - 12/29/00  56  216  220  90  25  397
Changes of finance minister  03/16/01  - 05/18/01  38  548  480  252  202  1,308
Cut ofinternational  credit  07/10/01 - 09/25/01  54  1,005  940  359  441  1,986
Hong Kong
Forward Rates
Total  01/04/93 - 06/05/01  2,240  58  12  165  -111  2,840
Tranquil Periods  1,908  15  6  53  -111  325
Crisis Periods  332  301  217  313  -47  2,840
Mexican crisis  01/10/95 - 04/10/95  62  73  38  106  -47  341
Early signs of financial  distress  01/27/97 - 02/21/97  19  50  9  112  -19  376
Attack on the Thai Bath  05/14/97 - 7/24/97  51  182  101  163  23  621
Ist Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  08/15/97 - 12/15/97  87  386  225  398  70  2,840
2nd Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  01/05/98 - 02/04/98  22  598  491  293  147  1,165
3rd Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  05/27/98 - 07/06/98  29  418  348  205  212  1,119
4th Attack on the Hong-Kong  dollar  07/10/98 - 10/06/98  62  426  306  272  178  1,309Table 2
Maximum Implied Devaluation  in Argentina and Hong Kong
Summary Statistics
The table  shows  the  maximum  devaluation  implied  by the  currency  premium  in Argentina  and Hong  Kong,  for different  probabilities  of devaluation  and
different  sample periods.  Under risk neutrality,  the  currency premium is equal  to the probability of devaluation  times the value  of the devaluation.  Therefore,
the  maximum  implied  devaluation  is obtained by dividing  the  maximum currency  premium observed  in  each sample  period  by the  assumed  probability  of
devaluation.  The currency premium for Argentina is calculated as the spread of local  peso time deposit rates over local U.S. dollar interbank deposit rates, with
maturities up to 2 months.  The currency premium for Hong Kong is calculated with the 1-month  forward discount.
The  crisis  periods  for Argentina  are  the following:  (i) Mexican  crisis,  (ii)  Attack  on  the  Hong Kong  dollar,  (iii)  Russia's  default,  (iv) Devaluation  of the
Brazilian  real,  (v)  Financial  Times  article  and  presidential  elections,  (vi)  Vice  president  resigns,  (vii)  Changes  of  finance  minister,  and (viii)  Cut  of
international  credit. The crisis  periods for Hong-Kong  are:  (i)  The  Mexican crisis,  (ii)  the Financial distress in Korea, (iii) the Attacks on the Thai baht and the
four attacks on  the Hong Kong dollar.  See text for a description of all the events.  All  rates are in basis points, annualized,  and continuously  compounded.
Dates  10%  25%  50%  75%  90%
Argentina
Time Deposit Rates
Up to 2 month
Total  04/01/93  -06/05/01  19,861  7,944  3,972  2,648  2,207
Tranquil  Periods (after the Mexican Crisis)  8,122  3,249  1,624  1,083  902
Crisis Periods  19,861  7,944  3,972  2,648  2,207
Mexican  crisis  01/10/95  -04/10/95  13,165  5,266  2,633  1,755  1,463
Attack on the Hong Kong dollar  10/29/97  - 11/26/97  3,934  1,574  787  525  437
Russia's  default  08/19/98 - 10/16/98  4,052  1,621  810  540  450
DevaluationoftheBrazilianreal  01/13/99-02/12/99  3,146  1,258  629  419  350
Financial Times  article and elections  05/17/99 - 12/17/99  3,968  1,587  794  529  441
Vice president resigns  10/06/00 - 12/29/00  3,974  1,590  795  530  442
Changes of finance minister  03/16/01 -05/18101  13,078  5,231  2,616  1,744  1,453
Cut of intemational  credit  07/10/01  - 09/25/01  19,861  7,944  3,972  2,648  2,207
Hong Kong
Forward Rates
Total  01/04/93 -06/05/01  28,398  11,359  5,680  3,786  3,155
Tranquil  Periods  3.252  1,301  650  434  361
Crisis Periods  28,398  11,359  5,680  3,786  3,155
Mexican crisis  01/10/95 - 04/10/95  3,409  1,364  682  455  379
Early signs of financial distress  01/27/97 -02/21/97  3,760  1,504  752  501  418
Attack on the Thai Bath  05/14/97 - 7/24/97  6,213  2,485  1,243  828  690
1st Attack on the Hong-Kong  dollar  08/15/97 - 12/15/97  28,398  11,359  5,680  3,786  3,155
2nd Attack on the Hong-Kongdollar  01/05/98 -02/04/98  11,651  4,660  2,330  1,553  1,295
3rd Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  05/27/98 - 07/06/98  11,187  4,475  2,237  1,492  1,243
4th Attack  on the Hong-Kong dollar  07/10/98 - 10/06/98  13,090  5,236  2,618  1,745  1,454Table 3
Alternative Measures of Currency Premia
Summary Statistics
The table shows summary  statistics for different measures of currency  premia for Argentina and Hong  Kong, using daily  1-month interest rates and 1-
month forward exchange  rate discounts  from 9/9198 to 9/25/01  for Argentina and  1/4/93  to 9/25/01  for Hong Kong.  The differences  in the number of
observations  are due to missing  values.  The interest rates used for Argentina include  the interbank  offer rate (BAIBOR),  the  interbank deposit rate
index or money  market index  (MMR) consisting of rates paid on deposits of more than I million pesos  or U.S. dollars,  and the time deposit rate for
deposits up to I million pesos or U.S. dollars.  Both the BAIBOR  and the MMR are from Bloomberg and the time deposit rates were obtained from the
Central Bank  of Argentina.  FoT  each type of rate, the currency premium for Argentina  is measured by the difference between the rate  denominated  in
domestic currency and that in U.S. dollars.  The forward exchange  rates for Argentina  are non-deliverable  forward  (NDF) rates  and the NDF currency
premium is measured by the forward discount NDF forward rates are from two sources: Deutsche  Bank and Bloomberg.
The interest rates  used for Hong Kong are interbank  offer rates (HIBOR), obtained from the Hong Kong Monetary  Authority. The premium  is obtained
over the U.S.-dollar  LIBOR.  The forward  rates used  for Hong Kong  are obtained  from Bloomberg  and  correspond  to deliverable  contracts.  All the
rates  are annualized, in percentages,  and continuously compounded.
Number of  Mean  Median  Standard  Min  Max
Observations  Deviation
Argentina
Interbank Offer Rates  720  318  144  487  29  5,217
Time Deposit Rates  726  214  126  271  -4  2,067
Interbank  Deposit Rates  704  206  93  312  0  2,305
Non-Deliverable Forward  Rates  737  857  228  1,772  42  14,726
Hong Kong
Interbank Offer Rates  2,090  39  1  150  -115  3,336
Deliverable Forward Rates  2,240  58  12  165  -111  2,840
Correlations
Interbank Offer  Time Deposit  Interbank  Non-Deliverable
Rates  Rates  Deposit Rates  Forward Rates
Interbank Offer Rates  I
Time Deposit Rates  0.83  1
Interbank  Deposit Rates  0.89  0.78  1
Non-Deliverable Forward Rates  0.91  0.82  0.85  1
Interbank  Offer  Deliverable
Rates  Forward Rates
Interbank Offer Rates  I
Deliverable Forward  Rates  0.94  1Table 4
Term Structure of Currency Premia
Summary Statistics
The  table shows the summary statistics  for the term  premia,  spread between the currency premium measured  with  12-month rates  over the one from 1-month
rates,  during crisis  and tranquil periods, for Argentina and Hong Kong.  The crisis periods for Argentina are the following:  (i) Mexican crisis, (ii) Attack on the
Hong  Kong  dollar,  (iii)  Russia's  default,  (iv)  Devaluation  of the  Brazilian  real,  (v)  Financial  Times  article  and  presidential  elections,  (vi)  Vice  president
resigns,  (vii) Changes of finance minister, and (viii) Cut of international  credit. 7he crisis periods  for Hong-Kong  are: (i) The Mexican crisis, (ii) the Financial
distress in Korea,  (iii) the  Attacks  on the Thai  baht and  the four attacks on  the Hiong Kong dollar.  See  text for a  description of all  the events. All rates  are in
basis  points, annualized and continuously  compounded.




Total  04/21/97-06/05/01  1,098  168  151  204  -2,283  864
Tranquil  Periods  720  139  134  95  -238  442
Crisis Periods  378  222  198  315  -2,283  864
Attack on the Hong Kong dollar  10/29/97  - 11/26/97  21  -24  -30  35  -81  54
Russia's default  08/19/98 - 10/16/98  42  81  49  95  -59  258
Devaluation of the Brazilianreal  01/13/99-  02/12/99  23  130  131  31  54  193
Financial Times article  and elections  05/17/99 - 12/17/99  149  444  486  126  200  627
Vice president resigns  10/06/00 - 12/29/00  56  124  130  47  -41  188
Changes of finance  minister  03/16/01  -05/18/01  38  -73  -114  249  -491  311
Cut of international  credit  07/10/01  - 09/25/01  49  158  222  621  -2,283  864
NDF Rates
Total  10/20/97-06/05/01  732  -12  270  1,198  -11,720  984
Tranquil  Periods (after the Mexican  Crisis)  393  231  282  423  -3,667  643
Crisis Periods  339  -293  160  1,657  -11,720  984
Russia's default  08/19/98 - 10/16/98  27  66  -1  278  -481  579
DevaluationoftheBrazilianreal  01/13/99-02/12/99  22  157  135  139  -120  337
Financial Times article and elections  05/17/99 - 12/17/99  143  502  490  276  44  984
Vice president resigns  10/06/00 - 12/29/00  56  33  46  159  -485  297
Changes of finance minister  03/16/01  -05/18/01  38  -1,295  -846  1,648  -7,200  251
2  Cut ofinternational  credit  07/10/01 - 09/25/01  53  -2,430  -2,348  2,872  -11,720  941
Hong Kong
Interbank Offer  Rates
Total  01/04/93-06/05/1)1  2,065  49  30  81  -836  358
Tranquil  Periods  1,754  50  32  69  -51  358
Crisis Periods  311  44  17  130  -836  346
Mexican crisis  01/10/95  -04/10,95  59  24  58  65  -175  99
Early signs of financial  distress  01/27/97 - 02/21/97  18  18  19  9  -7  38
Attack  on the Thai Bath  05/14/97 - 7/24/97  46  -8  -11  20  -44  25
1st  Attack on  the Hong-Kong dollar  08/15/97 - 12/15/97  81  6  -34  152  -836  345
2nd Attack on the Hong-Kong  dollar  01/05/98 - 02/04/98  20  137  169  139  -24  346
3rd Attack  on the Hong-Kong  dollar  05/27/98 - 07/06/98  28  81  104  129  -437  269
4th Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  07/10/98 - 10/06/98  59  118  156  158  -483  316
Forward Rates
Total  01/04/93-06/05,'01  2,152  37  25  118  -1,854  481
Tranquil Periods  1,820  45  26  81  -269  481
Crisis Periods  332  -9  -6  228  -1,854  430
Mexican crisis  01/10/95 -04/10/95  62  -16  11  79  -217  108
Early signs of financial distress  01/27/97 - 02/21/97  19  -37  7  113  -366  28
Attack on the Thai Bath  05/14/97 - 7/24/97  51  -143  -55  160  -570  3
IstAttackontheHong-Kongdollar  08/15/97-  12/15/97  87  -76  -37  312  -1,854  354
2nd Attack on the Hong-Kong  dollar  01/05/98 -02/04/98  22  139  263  219  -205  430
3rd Attack  on the Hong-Kong dollar  05/27/98 -07/06/98  29  93  125  163  -405  263
4th Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  07/10/98 - 10/06/98  62  114  175  186  -532  334Table 5
Determinants  of Currency Premia in Argentina
The columns of the table show the results  for regressions  of the  1-month  currency  premium  on a set o  explanatory  variables.  Columns  I to 5  correspond  to ordinary  least squares
(OLS) regressions  and columns 6  and 7 extend the model  to an exponential  garch (EGARCH).  The models estimated  are described  in equations  (15) and (16) in the paper.  The first
column  of the table shows the results  for the basic  specification,  including as regressors  (i) the spread of a  high yield  bond  index over a comparable  U.S. government  bond,  (ii)  the
EMBI spread  of Latin  American countries  excluding  Argentina,  and (iii)  the  ratio of total reserves of the central  bank to total  deposits and  (iv) the  ratio of total  cash held  by the
financial system  over total deposits.  The second specification,  column (2), adds  the Golman Sachs  measure of currency mislignment.  Specification (3)  disaggregates  the reserves of
the central bank into the ratio of reserves held in the  form of govemment bonds to total deposits  asd  the ratio of hard currency reserves to total deposits.  Specification  (4) tests the
effect of Argentina's  average foreign currency credit rating.
The last OLS specification, in column (5), tests the effects of external  and internal shocks on the conditional mean with two durnmy variables. The extemal shocks dummy captuTes
the  effect of the  Russian  defalut and the Brasilian  devaluation, while the  internal shocks  dummy  captures the effects  of the internal  crisis periods  during 1999 and 2001:  Financial
Times  article and presidential  elections,  Vice president resigns, Changes of Finance  Minister,  and Cut of international  credit.  In  all OLS  specifications 4 lags  in differences of the
dependent  variable  and all  regressors were  included.  In the EGARCH  specifications  the lags for the reserves  and cash ratios  could be treammed down to two,  allowing for a larger
sample  which improves convergence.  The EGARCH  specifications  use the basic  set of regressors and a dummy variable for all crisis  (internal and external): column (6) tests  for the
effects of the  crisis dummy in the conditional  mean and the last specification,  column  (7), tests  for its effects also  in  the conditional  variance.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  *
significant at  10%, **  at 5%, and +**  at 1%.
I-month NDF Discount
Dependent  variable  in First Differences:  (fl-s)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Lagged Dependent Variable  -0.326  -0.331  "'*  -0.319  -0.369  -0.369  -0.129  -0.140
(0.066)  (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.010)  (0.005)
High Yield Spread  -0.161  1.035  -0.424  1.343  1.071  0.219 **  -0.635
(0.952)  (1.095)  (O.g55)  (0.902)  (1.025)  (0.101)  (0.045)
GS Misalignment Measure  0.079
(0.131)
LAC EMBI Spread  0.640  0.369  **  0.666  0.438 **  0.287  0.013  0.033
(0.236)  (0.115)  (0.230)  (0.211)  (0.189)  (0.016)  (0.010)
Total Reserves  to Deposits Ratio (t-3)  -0.327  *+*  -0.441  *'  -0.185  -0.248  *  -0.109 *  -0.009  **
(0.117)  (0.112)  (0.133)  (0.128)  (0.007)  (0.003)
Bomd Reserves  to Deposits Ratio (t-3)  -0.040
(0.032)
Hard Currency  Reserves to Deposits  -0.292
Ratio (1-3)  (0.114)
Banks'Cash overDeposits  Ratio (t-3)  0.169  ***  0.162  *4*  0.161  *  0.115  **  0.283  *  0.048  t  0.007
(0.049)  (0.055)  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.082)  (0.003)  (0.001)
Average Foreign Currency Credit Rating  -8.598  **
(3.892)
External Shocks (Russia and Brasil)  1.957 *
(1.004)
Internal Shocks  3.358 *
(1.465)
Crisis Dummy  *  0.494 *  0.660  4*4
(0.061)  (0.046)
constant  9.584  -1.398  -6.313  47.254 *  55.715  *  3.125  t  1.772 #
(13.462)  (16.047)  (15.902)  (22.297)  (29.490)  (0.976)  (0.131)
time  0.007  0.007  0.000  0.007  0.000  W  0.001  *
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000)
earch  -0.468 +  0.045
(0.064)  (0.091)
arch-abs.  2.590 *  2.746  *44
(0.108)  (0.097)
egarch  0.918 *  0.828  *4*
(0.016)  (0.018)
Crisis Dummy  1.611  "'*
(0.129)
constant  -0.029  -0.692 *
(0.079)  (0.098)
Numberof observations  378  358  378  378  378  454  454
R
2 0.40  0.42  0.41  0.41  0.42
Maximum  numberoflags  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Q(S) p-value  0.88  0.92  0.85  0.86  0.91  0.08  0.56
Q(10)  p-value  0.72  0.78  0.76  0.67  0.70  0.23  0.59
Log-likelihood  -1203.63  -1145.88  -1201.02  -1201.76  -1197.90  -824.71  -740.44
Wald test ofjoint significance  0.00 *  0.00  '  0.00 *"*  0.00  *$  0.00  0.00  0.00 *"
(p-value)Table 6
Determinants of Term Premia in Argentina
The  columns  of the  table  show the  results for  regressions  of the  term  premium  on  a  set  o explanatory  variables.  Columns  I  to S correspond  to ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)
regressions  and columns  6 and  7  extend the model to an exponential garch (EGARCH).  The models estimated are described in equations (15) and (16) in the paper.  The first column
of the table shows the results for the basic specification,  including as regressors (i)  the US dollar LIBOR term premium, (ii)  the spread of a high yield bond index over a comparable
U.S.  government  bond,  (iii)  the  EMBI spread  of Latin American  countries excluding  Argentina,  and (iv)  the ratio  of total reserves of the central  bank  to total deposits  and  (v) the
ratio of total cash  held by the financial  system over total  deposits. The second specification,  column (2), adds the Golman Sachs measure  of currency mislignment.  Specification  (3)
disaggregates  the  reserves  of the  central  bank  into  the  ratio  of reserves  held  in  the  form  of government  bonds  to  total deposits  and  the  ratio  of hard  currency reserves  to  total
deposits.  Specification (4) tests the effect of Argentina's  average  foreign currency credit rating.
The  last OLS specification,  in column (5), tests  the effects of extemal  and  internal  shocks on the conditional  mean with two dummy variables.  The external shocks dummy captures
the effect  of the Russian  default and  the Brasilian  devaluation, while  the intemal  shocks  dummy captures  the effects  of the intemal  crisis periods  during  1999 and 2001:  Financial
Times article  and presidential  elections,  Vice  president  resigns, Changes  of Finance Minister,  and Cut of intemational  credit,  In all OLS specifications 4 lags in differences  of the
dependent  variable  and  all regressors  were included.  In  the EGARCH specifications  the lags  for the reserves  and cash ratios  could be treammed  down to two, allowing for a larger
sample which  improves  convergence.  The  EGARCH  specifications use the basic  set of regressors and a dummy variable for all  crisis (intemal and extemal):  column (6)  tests for the
effects  of the crisis dummy  in the conditional  mean and the last specification,  column  (7), tests  for its effects  also  in the conditional  variance.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. *
significant  at  10%, **  at 5%1,  and t**  at  1%.
Dependent  Variable In First  NDF Term Sructure
Differences:  (fl 2-s)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Lagged Dependent  Variable  -0.483  -0.508  *'*  -0.482  *  -0.510 **  -0.523  *'  -0.204  ***  -0.216
(0.078)  (0.081)  (0.076)  (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.009)  (0.009)
US Term  Structure  0.717  0.947  0.686  0.731  0.827  0.227  **  0.226  *5*
(0.664)  (0.856)  (0.694)  (0.663)  (0.723)  (0.046)  (0.038)
High Yield Spread  -0.622  -1.056  0.1)06  -1.509  -1.967  -0.082  -0.031
(1.130)  (0.849)  (1.045)  (1.089)  (1.100)  (0.098)  (0.084)
GS Misalignment  Measure  0.032
(0.133)
LAC EMBI Spread  -0.104  0.013  -0.209  0.062  0.313  0.139  **  0,139
(0.166)  (0.117)  (0.166)  (0.161)  (0.217)  (0.015)  (0.018)
Total Reserves to  Deposits Ratio (t-3)  0.237 **  0,317 *  0.143  0.145  0.017 **  0.019 *
(0.098)  (0.095)  (0.113)  (0.120)  (0.007)  (0.006)
Bomd  Reserves to Deposits Ratio  (t-3)  0 058 *
(0.031)
Hard Currency  Reserves  to Deposits  0.232  *
Ratio  (t-3)  (0.096)
Banks' Cash over  Deposits Ratio  (t-3)  -0.165  *5*  -0.173  *  -0.165  *  -0.131  '  -0.256  *5*  -0.046 *  -0.045  *
(0.047)  (0,050)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.066)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Average Foreign  Currency Credit Rating  4.916
(3.618)
Extemal  Shocks (Russia and  Brasil)  -2.095  t
(1.008)
Intemal Shocks  -2.931  I
(1.292)
Crisis Dummy  -0.552  *""  -0.559 *
(0.049)  (0.062)
constant  -22.729  *  -18.560  1.253  -45.397 **  -63.063  **  -13.500  - -0.523  **
(13.448)  (15.735)  (15.732)  (22.529)  (26.537)  (0.288)  (0.079)
tiTne  -0.003  -0.003  0.002  -0.002  0.000  0.000
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.000)
earch  0.529  ***  0.478  *
(0.069)  (0.079)
arch-abs.  2.051  ***  2.032 +
(0.104)  (0.112)
egarch  0.993  *i*  0.929  *
(0.014)  (0.017)
Crisis Dummy  0.786 *
(0.113)
constant  -0.152 +  -13.268  *
(0.062)  (1.091)
Numberofobservations  351  331  351  351  351  415  415
R2  0.46  0.47  0.47  0.46  0.47
Maximum  number of lags  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Q(5) p-value  0.48  0.73  0.49  0.44  0.69  0.32  0.88
Q(10)  p- value  0.52  0.73  0.56  0.46  0.64  0.67  0.99
Log-likelihood  -1070.58  -1013.29  -1067.26  -1069.79  -1065.11  -694.61  -672.76
Wald test ofjoint significance  0.00  0  0.00  .00.00  0.00  0.00 **  0.00  O*'  0.00'***
(p-value)Appendix Figure 1
Non-Deliverable Forward Discount and No-Arbitrage Bands
The  figure shows  the  1-month  Non-Deliverable  Forward (NDF) discount and two threshholds  defining no-arbitrage  bands.  The top  panel displays
the forward  discount  and two currency premia, the spread  between peso and dollar denominated  Argentine  interbank rates and the spread between
peso and dollar Argentine  time deposit rates.  In the middle panel, the upper threshhold consists of the difference  between the interbank offer rate in
pesos and the time deposit rate in dollars; the lower threshhold is the difference between  the time deposit rate in pesos and the interbank offer rate in
dollars.  In the  lower panel,  the  upper threshold  is  the difference  between  the BAIBOR  in pesos  and the  U.S.  deposit  rate  in dollars;  the  lower
threshold is the spread of the Argentine time deposit rate  in dollars over the  U.S. Federal  Funds Rate.  All rates are annualized,  in basis points,  and
continuously compounded.  See text for a discussion on arbitrage in case  1,  2 and 3.
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-NDF  discountAppendix Figure 2
Cross-Market  Currency Premium Differential
The figure shows the spread between the I -month forward discounts and the interbank  currency premium for Argentina and  Hong Kong. The interbank  rate for
Argentina  is the interbank  offer rate (BAIBOR)  obtained  from Bloomberg.  Since in Hong  Kong these rates are denominated  on]y  in Hong Kong  dollars, the
premium  is measured  by the  spread of these over the U.S.-dollar LIBOR.  The forward  exchange  rates for Argentina are non-deliverable forward  (NDF) rates
obtained  from  Deutsche  Bank  and  Bloomberg.  The  forward  rates  for  Hong  Kong  correspond  to  deliverable  contracts  and  come  from  Bloomberg.  The
interbank rates  used for Hong  Kong are  interbank offer rate (HIBOR),  obtained  from the Hong Kong Monetary  Authority.  All the rates are annualized,  in basis
points, and continuously compounded.
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Currency Premia and the No-Arbitrage  Band
The top  panel shows  summary statistics  fo  the  1-month  Non-Deliverable  Forward  (NDF)  discount and two threshholds  defining the  no-arbitrage  band.  The  upper
threshhold consists of the difference between the interbank offer rate in pesos and the time deposit rate in dollars.  The lower threshhold is the difference between the
time deposit rate in pesos and the interbank offer rate in dollars. The mid panel shows the histogram of tbe difference between the NDF discount and the upper band.
Since  there  are no  observations  bellow the lower  band,  negative  observations  correspond to observations  inside the no-arbitrage  band, while positive observations
correspond  to deviations  from the  no-arbitrage  condition.  The lower panel  shows economnetric  estimations  of revertion  to the no-arbitrage  band  for observations  of
the NDF discount  outside the  band and to the conditional  mean for observations of the NDF discount  inside the band.  All rates are annualized,  in basis points,  and
continuously  compounded.
Summary Statistics
Number of  Obs. in
Observations  Percent of  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Observations  Total
NDF discout  737  - 857  228  1,772  42  14,726
Upper band  1,098  458  287  568  100  6,702
Lower band  1,098  - -39  -49  148  -1,042  1,253
Obs. above the no-arbitrage band  220  30%  2,380  1,049  2,673  120  14,726
Obs. inside the no-arbitrage band  517  70%  209  150  189  42  2,141
140  Distribution of Deviations  from the Upper Band
120 j
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Observations  inside the  band 401
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Revertion of Forward Discount
[A(fd,-(i,-;*))  =c<+*"tAd,,.-(i,,*-i,,)+g,J  if  fd,.  > (i,. -iJ)
Afd,k  c'+AZfd,,+e,;f  if
£,t  -N(O, &-') and e,X  inN  rO,ain)
Including the "Cut of intemational credit" crisis period  Excluding the "Cut of intemational credit" crisis period
Dickey-  Dickey-Fuller
Ai  t-ratio  Fuller  1%  Half-life  Ai  t-ratio  1%  critical  Half-life
critical  value  value
outside no-arbitrage  band'  -0.16  -4.00  -3.49  3.86  -0.45  -7.24  -3.50  1.17
(0.04)  (0.06)
-0.07  -6.28  -3.44  9.68  -0.07  -6.28  -3.44  9.68
inside no-arbitrage  band-
(0.01)  (0.01)
I  The half-life corresponds  to the convergence to the non-arbitrage  band
2  The half-life corresponds  to the convergence to the conditional  meanAppendix  Table 2
Cross-Market Currency E'remium Differential
Summary Statistics
The  table shows summary  statistics  of the spread between  the  I -andl 2-month  forward  discounts and interbank currency premia  for Argentina and  Hong Kong,  using
different samples.  The currency premium  for Argentina  is calculated  as the spread  of local  peso over  local U.S.  dollar interbank  offer rates.  The currency premium for
Hong  Kong is the spread of Hong  Kong dollar interbank  offer rates  over the  U.S.-dollar LIBOR.  The  crisis periods for Argentina  are the following:  (i) Mexican crisis,
(ii)  Attack on the  Honlg Kong dollar,  (iii)  Russia's default,  (iv) Devaluation of the Brazilian  real, (v) Financial Times article and presidential elections,  (vi)  Vice president
resigns, (vit) Changes  of finance  minister, and  (viii)  Cut of intemational credit. The crisis periods  for Hong-Kong  are:  (i) The  Mex;can cr;s;s, (ii)  the Financia)  distleSg
in Korea,  (iii)  the  Attacks  on  the  Thai  baht  and the  four attacks  on  the  Hong Kong  dollar.  See  text for a  description  of all  the events.  All  rates  are in basis points,
annualized,  and continuously compounded.




Total  04/21/97-06/05/01  720  509  64  1,319  -109  11,221
Tranquil  Periods  392  154  37  493  -105  4,520
Crisis Periods  328  934  183  1,790  -109  11,221
Russia's  default  08/19/98 - 10/16/98  27  618  674  377  1  1,407
Devaluation of the Brazilian real  01/13/99 - 02/12/99  22  343  374  225  5  673
Financial  Times article and elections  05/17/99 - 12/17/99  141  79  60  109  -109  580
Vice president resigns  10/06/00 - 12/29/00  54  231  158  183  -14  712
Changes of finance minister  03/16/01 - 05/18/01  36  1,651  1,108  1,695  29  7,102
Cut of international  credit  07/10/01  -09/25/01  48  4,147  4,054  2,462  632  11,221
NDF-BAIBOR  12-month
Total  04/21/97-06/05/01  905  285  161  381  -202  2,252
Tranquil  Periods  546  201  142  229  -202  1,340
Crisis Periods  359  413  268  509  -154  2,252
Attack on the Hong Kong dollar  10/29/97  - 11/26/97  13  302  252  126  122  568
Russia's default  08/19/98 - 10/16/98  41  662  654  189  385  1,121
Devaluation of the Brazilian real  01/13/99 -02/12/99  22  369  369  150  150  730
Financial  Times article and elections  05/17/99 - 12/17/99  143  131  68  184  -154  595
Vice president resigns  10/06/00  - 12/29/00  54  141  127  90  -15  362
Changes of finance minister  03/16/01  -05/18/01  38  374  352  245  -83  916
Cut of international  credit  07/10/01  -09/25/01  48  1,431  1,510  569  -63  2,252
Hong Kong
FWD-HIBOR 1-month
Total  01/04/93 -06/05/01  2,090  18  6  57  -523  688
Tranquil  Periods  1,782  11  5  30  -85  306
Crisis Periods  308  57  24  123  -523  688
Mexican crisis  01/10/95  -04/10/95  59  36  22  48  -111  175
Early signs of financial  distress  01/27/97 -02/21/97  17  53  1  119  -20  386
Attack  on the Thai Bath  05/14/97 - 7/24/97  46  131  35  163  -26  535
1st Attack  on the Hong-Kong  dollar  08/15/97 - 12/15/97  81  44  23  132  -497  688
2nd Attack  on the Hong-Kong dollar  01/05/98 -02/04/98  19  61  44  132  -106  481
3rd Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  05/27/98 - 07/06/98  28  46  26  94  -181  317
4th Attack  on the Hong-Kong  dollar  07/10/98 - 10/06198  58  46  26  120  -523  404
FWD-HIBOR 12-month
Total  01/04/93 - 06/05/01  2,106  -5  -3  28  -833  150
Tranquil  Periods  1,795  -4  -3  14  -69  99
Crisis Periods  311  -12  -9  66  -833  150
Mexican crisis  01/10/95  -04/10/95  60  -24  -18  30  -194  43
Early signs of financial  distress  01/27/97 -02/21/97  18  -9  -10  8  -22  5
Attack on the Thai Bath  05/14/97 - 7/24/97  46  -13  -13  8  -32  1
1st Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  08/15/97  - 12/15/97  81  -29  -8  110  -833  150
2nd Attack on the Hong-Kong  dollar  01/05/98 - 02/04/98  20  4  19  60  -140  89
3rd Attack on the Hong-Kong dollar  05/27/98 - 07/06/98  28  16  13  31  -43  88
4th Attack  on the Hiong-Kong dollar  07/10/98 - 10/06/98  58  4  3  49  -257  136Appendix Table 3
Data Description
Deseription  Maturly  Sample  Source
Argentine data
Non-deliverable forward  Pesos per U.S. dollar;  for some  I and 12 months  9/9/98-9/25/01  Bloomberg (I  and  12
exchange rates (NDF)  dates the rates are reported as  (I-month)  months from 9/9/98); and
points for others as outright.  10/20/97-9/25/01  Deutsche Bank (12-moonth
(12-month)  before  9/9/98)
Spot exchange  rate  Pesos per U.S. dollars  - 10/20/97  -9/25/01  Bloomberg
Interbank offer rates in  Annualized  rate  I and 12 months  4/21/97 -9/25/01  Bloomberg
pesos and dollars (BAIBOR)
Time deposit rates  in pesos  Annualized  rate  I month and up to 2  1/4/1993  -6/5/01  central bank of Argentina
and dollars  months
Interbank deposit rates in  Annualized  rate  I month  1/13/1995  - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
pesos and dollars
Total reserves of the central  Total  reserves held by the central  - 12/29/1994 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
bank  bank of Argentina  (government  (original  source: central
bonds  and hard currency,  U.S.  bank of Agentina)
dollar, billions)
Bond reserves  of the central  Reserves  in Argentine government  - 12/29/1994 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
bank  bonds, (U.S. dollar, billions)  (original  source: central
bank of Agentina)
Hard currency reserves  Reserves  in hold, currency and  - 12/29/1994 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
short and long-term deposits  (U.S.  (original  source: central
dollar, billions)  bank of Agentina)
Total deposits  of the  Total Argentine bank deposits  - 12/29/1994 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
financial system  (U.S. dollar, millions)  (original  source:  central
bank of Agentina)
Total cash holdings of the  Cash holdings (effectivo)  in local  - 12/29/1994 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
financial system  and foreign currency (U.S. dollars,  (original source:  central
millions)  bank of Agentina)
Hong Kong data
Deliverable forward  Hong Kong  dollars per U.S. dollar  I and 12  months  1/4/93 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
exchange rate (FWD)
Spot exchange rate  Hong Kong dollars per U.S. dollar  - 1/4/93 -9/25/01  Bloomberg
Interbank rate  in Hong Kong  Annualized rate  I  and 12  months  1/4/93 - 9/25/01  Hong Kong Monetary
dollars  (HIBOR)  Authority
International  data
U.S. Federal Funds rates  Annualized  rate  I month  1/4/93 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
(FFR)
U.S. Deposit rates  Annualized  rate  I month  9/25/96-9/25/01  Bloomberg
U.S. Treasury bill rates  Annualized rate  3 and 12 months  1/4/93 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
U.S. dollar LIBOR  Annlualized rate  I and 12  months  1/4/93  - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
High yield spread  Spread of Moodys junk bond  - 1/4/93 - 9/25/01  Bloomberg
index over  the U.S. 30-year
government bond yield
EMBI spread for Latin  Weighted average of the EMBI  - 1/4/93 - 9/25/01  JP Morgan
American Countries  spreads of Latin American
countries excluding Argentina,
using 1999 GDP weightsPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2791  The Static and Dynamic  Incidence  of  Dominique  van de Walle  February 2002  H.  Sladovich
Vietnam's  Public Safety Net  37698
WPS2792  Determinants  of Life Insurance  Thorsten  Beck  February  2002  A.  Yaptenco
Consumption  across Countries  Ian Webb  31823
WPS2793  Agricultural Markets  and Risks:  Panos Varangis  February 2002  P. Kokila
Management of the Latter, Not the  Donald Larson  33716
Former  Jock R.  Anderson
WPS2794  Land  Policies and Evolving Farm  Zvi Lerman  February 2002  M.  Fernandez
Structures  in Transition  Countries  Csaba Csaki  33766
Gershon  Feder
WPS2795  Inequalities in  Health in  Developing  Adam Wagstaff  February 2002  H.  Sladovich
Countries:  Swimming  against the Tide?  37698
WPS2796  Do  Rural  Infrastructure  Investments  Jocelyn A.  Songco  February  2002  H.  Sutrisna
Benefit the  Poor?  Evaluating  Linkages:  88032
A Global  View, A Focus on Vietnam
WPS2797  Regional  Integration and Development  Maurice  Schiff  February 2002  P. Flewitt
in Small  States  32724
WPS2798  Fever and  Its Treatment  among the  Deon Filmer  March  2002  H.  Sladovich
More  or Less  Poor in Sub-Saharan  37698
Africa
WPS2799  The  Impact of the Indonesian  Lisa A.  Cameron  March  2002  P. Sader
Financial Crisis  on Children:  Data from  33902
100 Villages Survey
WPS2800  Did  Social Safety Net Scholarships  Lisa A.  Cameron  March  2002  P. Sader
Reduce Drop-Out  Rates  during the  33902
Indonesian  Economic  Crisis?
WPS2801  Policies to  Promote Saving for  Dimitri  Vittas  March 2002  P. Infante
Retirement:  A Synthetic Overview  37642
WPS2802  Telecommunication  Reforms, Access  Antonio  Estache  March 2002  G. Chenet-Smith
Regulation, and Internet Adoption  Marco Manacorda  36370
in  Latin America  Tommaso  M. Valletti
WPS2803  Determinants  of Agricultural  Growth  Yair Mundlak  March  2002  P. Kokila
in Indonesia,  the Philippines,  and  Donald  F. Larson  33716
Thailand  Rita  Butzer
WPS2804  Liberalizing Trade  in Agriculture:  John S.  Wilson  March 2002  P. Flewitt
Developing  Countries  in Asia and the  32724
Post-Doha Agenda
WPS2805  To  Spray or Not to Spray? Pesticides,  John  S. Wilson  March 2002  P. Flewitt
Banana  Exports,  and Food Safety  Tsunehiro  Otsuki  32724Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2806  Dirty Exports  and Environmental  John S. Wilson  March 2002  P. Flewitt
Regulation: Do Standards  Matter to  Tsunehiro Otsuki  32724
Trade?
WPS 2807  The Role of Natural Resources in  Benoit  Bosquet  March 2002  D. Duff
Fundamental  Tax Reform in the  39506
Russian Federation
WPS2808  A Capital Accord for  Emerging  Andrew Powell  March 2002  E. Mekhova
Economies  85984
WPS2809  On the Measurement  and Impact of  Robert D. Ebel  March  2002  M.  Morris
Fiscal  Decentralization  Serdar Yilmaz  37285
WPS2810  Growth,  Distribution,  and Poverty  Luc  Christiaensen  March 2002  N.  Nouviale
in Africa:  Messages from  the  1990s  Lionel Demery  34514
Stefano  Paternostro
WPS2811  The Epidemiological  Impact of an  John Stover  March 2002  H. Sladovich
HIV/AIDS  Vaccine  in Developing  Geoff P. Garnett  37698
Countries  Steve  Seitz
Steven  Forsythe
WPS2812  Can  Financial Markets  be Tapped to  Jerry Skees  March 2002  P. Kokila
Help Poor People Cope with Weather  Panos Varangis  33716
Risks?  Donald  Larson
Paul Siegel
WPS2813  The Collective Model  of the Household  Kaushik Basu  March 2002  N.  Jameson
and an  Unexpected  Implication for  Ranjan Ray  30677
Child Labor:  Hypothesis and an
Empirical  Test
WPS2814  Estimating  the  Endogenously  Gayatri Koolwal  March 2002  N.  Jameson
Determined  Intrahousehold Balance  Ranjan  Ray  30677
of Power and  Its Impact on  Expenditure
Pattern:  Evidence  from  Nepal